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Abstract
C. I. Lewis invented modern modal logic as a theory of “strict implication” J.
Over the classical propositional calculus one can as well work with the unary
box connective. Intuitionistically, however, the strict implication has greater
expressive power than 2 and allows to make distinctions invisible in the ordinary
syntax. In particular, the logic determined by the most popular semantics of
intuitionistic K becomes a proper extension of the minimal normal logic of the
binary connective. Even an extension of this minimal logic with the “strength”
axiom, classically near-trivial, preserves the distinction between the binary and
the unary setting. In fact, this distinction has been discovered by the functional
programming community in their study of “arrows” as contrasted with “idioms”.
Our particular focus is on arithmetical interpretations of intuitionistic J in
terms of preservativity in extensions of HA, i.e., Heyting’s Arithmetic.
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1. Introduction
More is possible in the constructive realm than is dreamt of in classical phi-
losophy. For example, we have nilpotent infinitesimals ([MR13]) and the cate-
goricity of weak first-order theories of arithmetic ([McC88], [McC91], this paper
Appendix C.4.2). We zoom in on one such possibility: the original modal con-
nective of “strict implication” J proposed by C. I. Lewis [Lew18; LL32], and
hence called here the Lewis arrow, does not reduce to the unary box 2 over
constructive logic. This simple insight opens the doors for a plethora of new
intuitionistic modal logics that cannot be understood solely in terms of the box.
To the best of our knowledge, this observation was originally made in the area of
preservativity logic [Vis85; Vis94; Iem03; IDZ05] and metatheory of arithmetic
provides perhaps the most interesting applications of intuitionistic J. However,
one can claim that a similar discovery has been independently made in the study
of functional programming in computer science (cf. § 7.1).
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We begin in § 2 by recalling Lewis’ invention of strict implication, mostly
remembered by historians; these days, modal logic is almost by default taken to
be the theory of boxes and diamonds. After sketching how J fell into disuse and
neglect, we speculate whether removing the law of excluded middle could have
saved Lewis’ vision of modal logic. This is also a good opportunity to highlight
some unexpected analogies between the fates of Brouwer’s and Lewis’ projects.
In § 3, we clarify how the intuitionistic distinction between φ J ψ and
2(φ→ ψ) is reflected in Kripke semantics. This may well prove the most natural
way of introducing this connective for many readers.
In § 4, we present the minimal deduction system1 iA and numerous additional
principles used in the remainder in the paper. In § 4.2, we clarify connections
between them, i.e., the inclusion relation between corresponding logics.
With the syntactic apparatus ready, we turn in § 5 to a major motivation for
the study of J: logics of Σ01-preservativity of arithmetical theories as contrasted
with more standard logics of provability. In order to provide an umbrella notion
for the study of arithmetical interpretations of modal connectives, we begin this
section by setting up a general framework for schematic logics, which may prove
of interest in its own right.
In § 6, we are finally tying together the semantic setup of § 3 and the syntactic
infrastructure of § 4 by providing a discussion of completeness and correspon-
dence results. Some of them are well-known, others are new. Having a complete
semantics for the logics under consideration allows us in § 6.3 to complement
earlier syntactic derivations (given in § 4.2) with examples of non-derivations.
In § 7, we are presenting other applications of strong arrows and strong boxes.
In fact, what we call here “strong arrows” turns out to correspond directly to
“arrows” in functional programming. We are also briefly discussing connections
with logics of guarded (co)recursion and intuitionistic logics of knowledge.
But while intuitionistic J can be (re)discovered in areas ranging from com-
puter science to philosophy, in our view arithmetical interpretations are most
developed and interesting. Thus, in § 8 we return to the theme of § 5 presenting
some applications of the logic of preservativity. In § 8.1 we discuss the applica-
tion of preservativity to the study of the provability logic of Heyting Arithmetic
HA. In § 8.2, we show that preservativity allows a more satisfactory expression
of the failure of Tertium non Datur.
The paper has several appendices that offer some supporting material. Ap-
pendix A collects basic facts about realizability needed in other sections. In
Appendices B and C, we provide some basic insights in Π01-conservativity log-
ics and interpretability logics. These insights strengthen our understanding of
preservativity logic both by extending this understanding and by offering a con-
trast to this understanding. Finally, Appendix D discusses the collapse of J
in Lewis’ first monograph, i.e., A Survey of Symbolic Logic [Lew18] from the
perspective of our deductive systems.
1It was baptised “iP” by Iemhoff and coauthors [Iem01b; Iem03; IDZ05], but this acronym
ties J too tightly to preservativity.
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Of course, we are of the opinion that the reader should carefully study ev-
erything we put in the paper. However, we realize that this expectation is not
realistic. For this reason, we present several roadmaps through the paper.2
The basic option is to read §§ 2–4 to get the basics of motivational background,
the Kripke semantics and an impression of possible reasoning systems.
? The reader who wants more solid treatment of Kripke semantics can extend
the basic option with § 6.
| The computer science package consists of the basic option and § 7.
= The reader who wants to go somewhat more deeply into the history of the
subject can extend the basic option with Appendix D.
« The reader who wants to understand the basics of arithmetical interpretations
can extend the basic option with § 5.
» An extended package for arithmetical interpretations combines « with § 8.
– The full arithmetical package extends » with Appendices A, B and C.
2. The rise and fall of the house of Lewis
2.1. “The error of philosophers”
We are reflecting on L.E.J. Brouwer’s heritage half a century after his passing.
Given his negative views on the roˆle of logic and formalisms in mathematics, it
seems somewhat paradoxical that these days the name of intuitionism survives
mostly in the context of intuitionistic logic.3 One is reminded in this context of
what Nietzsche called the error of philosophers:
The philosopher believes that the value of his philosophy lies in the whole,
in the structure. Posterity finds it in the stone with which he built and
with which, from that time forth, men will build oftener and better—in
other words, in the fact that the structure may be destroyed and yet have
value as material.4
2Note also that reading the electronic version may sometimes prove easier due to om-
nipresent hyperlinks: apart from all the usually clickable entities (citations or numbers of
(sub)sections, footnotes and table- or theorem-like environments . . . ), even most names of
logical systems can be clicked upon to retrieve their definition in Tables 4.1 and 4.2. When
reading a hardcopy, we advise keeping these Tables handy, perhaps jointly with Figure 6.2.
3A related and better-known paradox is that Brouwer’s own name survives in mainstream
mathematics mostly in connection with his work on topology, which is confirmed by several
contributions in this collection. This despite the fact that he rejected these results on philo-
sophical grounds and was actively involved in topological research only for the period necessary
to secure academic recognition and international status. Moreover, it seems a myth that the
non-constructive character of his most famous topological publications turned Brouwer into
an intuitionist. There is ample evidence that while the exact form of his intuitionism evolved
somewhat, his philosophical beliefs predate these results. Cf. van Stigt [van90b] for a detailed
discussion of all these points.
4Human, All-Too-Human, Part II, translated by Paul V. Cohn.
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We feel thus excused to focus on propositional logics based on the intuitionistic
propositional calculus (IPC). More specifically, our interest lies in an intuition-
istic take on a formal language developed by an author nearly perfectly con-
temporary with Brouwer: Clarence Irving Lewis5, the father of modern modal
logic. And this time, the reason for this does not come from the well-known
Go¨del(-McKinsey-Tarski) translation of IPC into the system Lewis denoted as
S4, which is discussed elsewhere in this collection.
One can also see a certain irony in the fate of Lewis’ systems. They were
explicitly designed to give an account of “strict implication” J. The unary 2
can be introduced using
2φ↔ (> J φ). (1)
In fact, Lewis designed J and 2 as mutually definable,6 setting
φ J ψ := 2(φ→ ψ) (2)
and over subsequent decades, modal logic in a narrow sense turned into the
theory of unary 2 and/or 3. In a broader sense, pretty much any intensional
operator extending the usual supply of connectives can be called a modality.
Modalities came to represent not only necessity, but also arithmetical provabil-
ity, knowledge, belief, obligation, and various forms of guarded quantification:
validity after all possible program executions, in all accessible states, in all fu-
ture time instants or at every point in an open neighbourhood (the list, of course,
is far from being exhaustive). Just like in the case of intuitionistic logic, a wide
range of semantics for modalities have been investigated, the most prominent be-
ing the Kripke semantics (relational structures), but also topologies, coalgebras,
monoidal endofunctors on categories or more recent “possibility semantics”.
Thus, Lewis’ dissatisfaction with material or extensional implication and
disjunction, expressed first in a short 1912 article [Lew12], has ultimately led to
the spectacular success story of modal logic, much like Brouwer’s7 dissatisfaction
with non-constructive usage of implication and disjunction has ultimately led
to the spectacular success story of intuitionistic logic. And yet, while Lewis did
5He was born two years later than Brouwer and died two years earlier.
6To be precise, in his books Lewis did not use 2 as a primitive. His exact formulation of
φ J ψ was ¬3(φ ∧ ¬ψ). However, in the classical setting, this one is obviously equivalent to
the one given by (2), and the reliance of Lewis’ formulation on involutive negation would be
a major problem over IPC. See Appendix D for a more detailed examination of the roˆle of
involutive/classical negation in Lewis’ original system.
7Speaking of Brouwer, note again the parallelism of dates: 1912, the year when Lewis
fired his first shots for intensional connectives by publishing Implication and the Algebra
of Logic [Lew12], is also the year when Brouwer obtained his position at the University of
Amsterdam, was elected to the Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences, delivered
his famous inaugural address Intuitionism and Formalism and became liberated to pursue
his own program. We refrain here from investigating further analogies, such as the fact that
Lewis wrote his 1910 PhD on The Place of Intuition in Knowledge (cf. Murphey [Mur05, Ch.
1] for an extended discussion), that he had a solid background in idealism and Kant and that
he remained under strong influence of these philosophical positions throughout his career.
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not write much on formal logic after Symbolic Logic8 published in 1932 [LL32],
his occasional remarks do not suggest he would approve of the scattering of
his Strict Implication systems into a bewildering galaxy of unimodal calculi.
Indeed, he was not only opposed to the very name modal logic, but believed
that his formalisms is the exact opposite of real “modal” logic, which in his
view was . . . the extensional system of Principia Mathematica:
There is a logic restricted to indicatives; the truth-value logic most im-
pressively developed in Principia Mathematica. But those who adhere to
it usually have thought of it—so far as they understood what they were
doing—as being the universal logic of propositions which is independent
of mode. And when that universal logic was first formulated in exact
terms, they failed to recognize it as the only logic which is independent
of the mode in which propositions are entertained and dubbed it “modal
logic”. (Cf. [Mur05, p. 203])
His own belief was that
the relation of strict implication expresses precisely that relation which
holds when valid deduction is possible [emphasis ours]. It fails to hold
when valid deduction is not possible. In that sense, the system of Strict
Implication may be said to provide that canon and critique of deductive
inference which is the desideratum of logical investigation [LL32, p. 247]
and that
Strict Implication explains the paradoxes incident to truth-implication.
[LL32, p. 247]
While the failure of Lewis’ systems to conquer this intended territory had to do
with philosophical prejudices of the following decades, they were also simply less
suited for these purposes than Lewis thought. The original system of A Survey
of Symbolic Logic in 1918 [Lew18]—stemming back to a 1914 paper [Lew14]—
was plagued by a number of issues, the most famous one pointed out by Post:
the combination of an axiom equivalent to (in an updated notation)
(2φ J 2ψ) J (¬ψ J ¬φ)
with other axioms and classical negation laws trivialized the modality and col-
lapsed strict implication to material implication [Lew20]. We provide an ex-
tended analysis of Lewis’ SSL problem in Appendix D; we believe it is an inter-
esting application of the intuitionistic theory of J discussed in this paper.9 In
8Symbolic Logic was a collaboration between C. I. Lewis and C. H. Langford. The authors,
however, made it clear in the preface who wrote and is “ultimately responsible” for which
chapter, a practice rather uncommon today. All the passages quoted in this paper come from
chapters written by Lewis. As Murray G. Murphey says in his monograph on C. I. Lewis:
“Symbolic Logic was less a cooperative venue than a coauthored book . . . To what extent each
advised the other on their separate chapters is left unclear, but probably there was not much
of an attempt to harmonize . . . Langford’s theory of propositions, for example, in Chapter IX
is clearly not Lewis’s theory.” [Mur05, p.183].
9Cf. also the discussion by Murphey [Mur05, pp. 101–102] or Parry [Par70].
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Symbolic Logic [LL32]—more precisely, in its famous Appendix II—Lewis was
more cautious, creating several “lines of retreat” (as Parry [Par70] described
it) in the form of S3, S2 and S1. At least on the technical front, this time
things went better. Immediate polemics focused on possibility of definability of
intensional connectives in extensional systems, but none of the authors involved
proposed anything resembling what we much later came to know as the Standard
Translation of modal logic into predicate logic.10 There were, however, subtler
problems, pointed out in in the post-war period by Ruth Barcan Marcus:11
it is plausible to maintain that if strict implication is intended to system-
atize the familiar concept of deducibility or entailment, then some form
of the deduction theorem should hold for it. [Bar53]
She showed [Bar46; Bar53] that S1 to S3 fail this criterion, for several conceivable
formulations of the Deduction Theorem. And those which behave somewhat
better in this respect, i.e., from S4 upwards are too strong to capture a general
notion of strict implication which Lewis would approve of.
In fact, S4 and S5, which we came to count among normal systems (unlike
S1–S3) and for which the advantage of switching to the unary setting is most
obvious, for Lewis himself were foster children he was forced to adopt. As is
well-known, it was Oskar Becker12 [Bec30] who proposed these axioms, even
calling one of them the Brouwersche Axiom; let us not discuss the adequacy of
this name here, but not only does it provide us with another excuse to mention
Brouwer in this paper, it has also survived until today in names of systems like
KB or KTB. Becker intended to cut the number of non-equivalent modalities in
the calculus, a goal which seems rather orthogonal to Lewis’ plans:
Those interested in the merely mathematical properties of such systems of
symbolic logic tend to prefer more comprehensive and less strict systems
such as S5 and material implication. The interests of logical study would
probably be best served by an exactly opposite tendency. [LL32, p. 502]
Kurt Go¨del did review Becker’s work [Go¨d86, p. 216–217] and was familiar
with William T. Parry’s early analysis of the notion of analytic implication
based on J [Go¨d86, p. 266–267].13 This apparently led14 to his landmark 1933
10Cf., e.g., the attempts of Bronstein&Tarter or Abraham addressed, respectively, by McK-
insey and Fitch; see Murphey [Mur05, Ch. 6] for references. It is worth pointing out that
Lewis himself [LL14] dealt with this question in a paper published only posthumously (with
Langford as a “nominal” coauthor, see editor’s note [Mar14] for a contemporary perspective).
11Her earliest papers [Bar46] are signed by her maiden surname, Ruth Barcan, which sur-
vives until today in the name of the Barcan formula.
12Although many developments discussed in this subsection—in particular proposing and
justifying S4 axioms with an explicit Brouwerian motivation—had their forerunner in a ne-
glected 1928 paper by Ivan E. Orlov, cf. [Dosˇ92; Baz03].
13As another small example how modal and intuitionistic inspirations tended to work hand-
in-hand for Go¨del: his proof that IPC is not characterized by any finite algebra [Go¨d86, p.
268–271] is presented as an answer to a question posed by Otto Hahn during a discussion
following Parry’s presentation.
14His short review of Becker points out that Becker’s attempts to relate modal logic to “the
intuitionistic logic of Brouwer and Heyting” and claims that steps taken by Becker to “deal
with this problem on a formal plane” are unlikely to succeed; Orlov (cf. Footnote 12) was
more insightful, but it does not appear that Go¨del was familiar with his paper.
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paper [Go¨d86, p. 296–303] translating the nascent intuitionistic calculus into
what turns out to be a notational variant of S4 formulated with unary box as a
primitive. Thus, immediately after Symbolic Logic was published, Go¨del pretty
much doomed the fate of J and condemned non-normal systems to at most
secondary status: his paper not only provided an independent motivation (in
terms of “the intuitionistic logic of Brouwer and Heyting” . . . ) for the study of
extensions of S4 rather than subsystems of S3, but also highlighted the elegance
and conciseness of 2-based axiomatizations for these logics.
In short, it appears that regardless of the fact that historical circumstances
did not favour Lewis, none of his systems was destined to success or genuinely
free of design or conceptual issues. Nevertheless, the idea of providing an im-
plication connective yielding tautologies only when the antecedent is genuinely
relevant for the consequent proved prescient.15 In fact, one can easily argue
that even the later enterprise of relevance logic would not satisfy Lewis’ expec-
tations: he wanted to supplement material implication with a strict one, not
replace it altogether. In this sense, still more recent resource-aware formalisms
with computer-science motivation where both a substructural and an intuitionis-
tic/classical implication are present (either as an abbreviation or directly in the
signature) like linear logic [Gir87; Tro92; Abr93; Bie94] or the logic of bunched
implications BI [OP99; Pym02; POY04] seem closer to Lewis’ original idea.
2.2. Could Brouwerian inspiration help Lewis’ systems?
At the time of publication of Symbolic Logic, Lewis was both familiar with and
open to non-boolean extensional connectives. The chapters he wrote for that
monograph deal in detail with n-valued systems of  Lukasiewicz.16 At the same
time, he published a paper on Alternative systems of logic [Lew32]. In both
these references, he discusses possible definitions of “truth-implications” [LL32]
or “implication-relations” [Lew32] one can entertain in finite, but not necessarily
15The connection between modal logics and relevance logics has been always actively de-
bated, see, e.g., Mares [Mar04, Ch. 6] for an extended presentation, including a reminder that
Ackermann’s 1956 paper which “began the study of relevant entailment” took issue with some
tautologies valid for Lewis’ J, in particular ex falso quodlibet. But in fact the relationship
can be traced back at least to 1933, when Parry in his work on analytic implication based on
J proposed what relevance logicians came to know as the variable sharing criterion: much
later, Dunn [Dun72] noted that Parry’s system is contained in S4 and proposed a “demodal-
ization” of Parry’s original system still preserving that criterion. As another connection with
Go¨del, let us note that his discussion [Go¨d86, p. 266–267] of the work of Parry suggested a
completeness result that was only proved in 1986 by Fine [Fin86]. Moreover, one can push
the clock back even beyond Parry and Go¨del, to the paper of Orlov (cf. Footnote 12), which
seems the first attempt to relate relevance, intuitionistic, and modal principles, including the
first axiomatization of what came to be known as the implicative-negative fragment of the
relevance logic R [Dosˇ92]. Let us note here the view of van Atten [van07] that “logic as
Brouwer sees it is a relevance logic”, rejecting in particular ex falso (absent also in earliest
versions of formalizations of intuitionistic logic by Kolmogorov and Glivenko), which subverts
the standard understanding of the BHK interpretation (cf § 7.1 below).
16At the time, Lewis still attributed it to a collaboration between  Lukasiewicz and Tarski.
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binary matrices. The latter paper also contains a rare (perhaps the only one)
reference to Brouwer in his writings:
[T]he mathematical logician Brouwer has maintained that the law of the
Excluded Middle is not a valid principle at all. The issues of so difficult a
question could not be discussed here; but let us suggest a point of view at
least something like his. . . . The law of the Excluded Middle is not writ in
the heavens: it but reflects our rather stubborn adherence to the simplest
of all possible modes of division, and our predominant interest in concrete
objects as opposed to abstract concepts. The reasons for the choice of our
logical categories are not themselves reasons of logic any more than the
reasons for choosing Cartesian, as against polar or Gaussian coo¨rdinates,
are themselves principles of mathematics, or the reason for the radix 10
is of the essence of number. [Lew32, p. 505]
Of course, the question of Lewis’ own potential take on combining IPC and
J remains speculative: it does not seem he was familiar with the work of Kol-
mogorov, Glivenko and Heyting, turning Brouwer’s philosophical insights into
a propositional calculus. Nevertheless, let us note two points:
• even the collapse of Lewis’ original system [Lew14; Lew18] was caused by
classical laws combined with a misguided boolean inspiration, namely the
insistence on involutivity of the strict negation (cf. Appendix D);
• even when considering classical Kripke frames, the negation-free logic ob-
tained by replacing→ with J is a sublogic of the intuitionistic logic [Cor87;
Dosˇ93; CJ01; CJ05] (see also Question 4.3).
Our paper, however, focuses on an even more fundamental advantage of studying
the theory of J over IPC. Whatever is there to be said about the universal
logic of propositions which is independent of mode and its extensional basis,
defining J using (2) is premature in the constructive setting. Furthermore,
instances of such a “constructive strict implication” can be seen in areas ranging
from metatheory of intuitionistic arithmetic to functional programming, often
satisfying very different laws to those strict implication was supposed to obey;
indeed, sometimes rather meaningless classically. For example,
Sa (φ→ ψ)→ (φ J ψ)
holds in numerous logics justified from a computational/Curry-Howard (§ 7),
arithmetical (§ 5.4.4) or even philosophical (§ 7.3) point of view.17
3. Strict implication in intuitionistic Kripke semantics
It is time to begin a more systematic discussion, starting with the relational
interpretation of J. In this paper, we are concerned with the following propo-
17From a Lewisian point of view, would intuitionistic → be the “strict” implication and J
be the “material” implication in such systems?
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sitional languages: LJ (with Lewis’ arrow), L2 (the unimodal one, identified
with a fragment of LJ) and L (the propositional language of IPC):
LJ φ ::= ⊥ | > | p | (φ ∧ φ) | (φ ∨ φ) | (φ→ φ) | (φ J φ),
L2 φ ::= ⊥ | > | p | (φ ∧ φ) | (φ ∨ φ) | (φ→ φ) | (2φ),
L φ ::= ⊥ | > | p | (φ ∧ φ) | (φ ∨ φ) | (φ→ φ).
As usual, ¬φ abbreviates φ→ ⊥.
For the sake of clarity, the binding priorities are as follows: unary connectives ¬
and 2 bind strongest, next comes J, then ∧ and ∨, and finally →.
Regarding associativity, it is used tacitly for ∧ and ∨, just like commutativity.
Regarding → and J, they are commonly assumed to associate to the right, but we
will be careful not to overuse this convention, as it can be confusing.
We begin with recalling the basic setup of intuitionistic Kripke frames for L2.18
They come equipped with two accessibility relations. One of them, which we
will denote by , is a partial ordering19 interpreting intuitionistic implication:
k  φ→ ψ if, for all `  k, if `  φ, then `  ψ. (3)
This forces the denotation of → to be -persistent or, as some authors
say, “monotone” or “upward-closed”. It is enough to impose (3) and require
-persistence of atoms to ensure persistence for all L-formulas. The other ac-
cessibility relation < is the modal one. There are two choices one can make to
ensure -persistence for 2:
One is to modify the satisfaction clauses. This might be a reasonable
thing to do, for one might wish to use the partial order to give a more
intuitionistic reading of the modalities. The other remedy is to impose
conditions on models that ensure that the monotonicity lemma does hold.
[Sim94, §3.3]
In fact, in a unimodal language the difference between these two strategies is not
essential; it becomes more consequential when a single accessibility relation is
used to interpret, for example, both 2 and 3 (see [Sim94, §3.3] for a discussion
and more references). Still, most references choose the latter one, i.e., keeping
the same reading of 2 as in the classical case and imposing conditions on the
interaction of  and < to ensure persistence.
Boz˘ic´ and Dos˘en [BD84] have established that in the presence of unary 2
with semantics defined by
18As far as L2 is concerned, our discussion largely follows Litak [Lit14]. The reader is
referred there for more details and references.
19In fact, it is essential only that the relation is a preorder (i.e., a reflexive and transitive
relation), but such a generalization brings no tangible benefits from the point of view of
expressivity, definability and completeness of propositional logics.
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Figure 3.1: Minimal conditions one can impose on 2-frames and J-frames. See Figure 6.2
for a visual representation of other conditions corresponding to additional axioms.
k  2φ if, for all ` = k, `  ψ
persistence is equivalent to the condition
2-p if k  ` < m, then, for some `′, we have k < `′  m
(i.e., ·< ⊆ < ·, where “ · ” denotes relational composition). However, most
references require tighter interaction. On certain occasions, like in Goldblatt
[Gol81], one sees a strengthening to
J-p if k  ` < m, then k < m (i.e., · < ⊆ <).
But the most common one (see, e.g., [Sot84; WZ97; WZ98]) is the still stronger
mix if k  ` < m  n, then k < n (i.e., ·< · ⊆ <).
This condition naturally obtains in a canonical model construction a` la Stone
and Jo´nsson-Tarski for prime filters of (reducts of) Heyting algebras with normal
2 [BD84; Sot84; Ko¨h81; BJ13]. Moreover, mix is “mostly harmless” for 2: it
can be obtained from 2-p by adding the requirement that for any `, the set of
its <-successors is -upward closed, that is,
brilliancy if k < `  m, then k < m (i.e., < · ⊆ <).
The name, to the best of our knowledge, has been proposed by Iemhoff [Iem01b;
Iem01a; Iem03; IDZ05], another one being strongly condensed [BD84]. As noted
in standard references [BD84; Gol81], not only brilliancy cannot be defined using
2, but any model satisfying 2-p can be made brilliant without changing the
satisfaction relation for 2-formulas in a straightforward way: by replacing <
by its composition with .
Consider now the Lewisian strict implication φ J ψ. Here is the natural
satisfaction clause in this semantics, directly transferring the classical one:
k  φ J ψ if, for all ` = k, if `  φ, then `  ψ. (4)
The first consequence of such an enrichment of the language is that 2-p becomes
too weak to ensure persistence. Let us state this formally, defining for this
purpose a somewhat too general notion:
Definition 3.1. A preframe is a triple F := 〈W,,<〉, where  is a partial
order, and < is a binary relation. A premodel based on F is K := 〈F , V 〉, where
V is a valuation mapping propositional variables to -upward closed sets. The
forcing relation K, k  φ is defined in the standard way for the intuitionistic
connectives and using equation (4) for J.
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It can be easily shown (see, e.g., [Zho03; IDZ05]) that the condition equivalent
to persistence becomes precisely J-p , that is:
Fact 3.2. For a preframe K := 〈W,,<〉, J-p above corresponds to the follow-
ing condition: for any two sets U, V upward closed wrt , the set
U J V := {k ∈W | ∀` = k, if ` ∈ U, then ` ∈ V }
is upward closed wrt .
We will thus take J-p to be the minimal condition in what follows.
Definition 3.3. A (J-)frame is a preframe satisfying J-p .
We can define in a standard way what it means for a formula to be valid or
refuted in a class of models.
As we have already suggested, for LJ the brilliancy condition does not remain
“mostly harmless” in the sense described above for L2:
Fact 3.4. [Zho03] The following conditions are equivalent for a J-frame:
• validity of (φ ∧ ψ) J χ→ φ J (ψ → χ);
• validity of ψ J χ→ > J (ψ → χ);
• validity of brilliancy .
One easily sees the converse implication
φ J (ψ → χ)→ (φ ∧ ψ) J χ
and, consequently, its special instance (where φ is equal to >)
2(ψ → χ)→ ψ J χ
to be valid on any J-frame; see Lemma 4.1 for a syntactic derivation.
Let us take stock. In order to restore definability of J in terms of 2, i.e.,
validity of (2) above, one needs to impose the brilliancy condition. In general,
2(φ→ ψ) implies φ J ψ, but not necessarily the other way around. Of course,
in classical Kripke frames,  is a discrete order, which trivializes all conditions
discussed above and all distinctions between them. As we will see in Corollary
4.8, the boolean deconstruction of J can be also derived syntactically. We will
return to Kripke semantics in § 6 below.
4. Axiomatizations
4.1. A fistful of logics
In this section, we present a Hilbert-style study of LJ-logics. Discussion of
arithmetically oriented principles was originated by Visser [Vis81; Vis82; Vis85;
Vis94] and developed further by Iemhoff and coauthors [Iem01b; Iem03; IDZ05],
who also studied the basic theory ofJ-frames. IPC and CPC denote, respectively,
the intuitionistic propositional calculus and its classical counterpart.
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4.1.1. Logics in L2
Before we start discussing J-logics in § 4.1.2, Table 4.1 presents some axioms
involving only 2, which is a definable connective in LJ.
Table 4.1: List of principles for 2. Here, the names of systems in the right column refer
to languages restricted to connectives appearing in the axiomatization, i.e., not involving J.
Later in the text, we will also use some of these principles as axioms over iA, i.e., the minimal
“normal” system for J (cf. Table 4.2), where 2 is a defined connective.
N2 ` φ ⇒ ` 2φ
K2 2(φ→ ψ)→ 2φ→ 2ψ
42 2φ→ 22φ
C42 22φ→ 2φ
L2 2(2φ→ φ)→ 2φ
S2 φ→ 2φ
SL2 (2φ→ φ)→ φ
Lei 2(φ ∨ ψ)→ 2(φ ∨ 2ψ)
CB2 2φ→ (ψ → φ) ∨ ψ
CB′2 2(ψ → φ)→ (ψ → φ) ∨ ψ
Lin2 2(φ→ ψ) ∨ 2(ψ → φ)
peirce ((φ→ ψ)→ φ)→ φ
em φ ∨ ¬φ
CPC := IPC + peirce
i-K2 := IPC + N2 + K2
i-GL2 := i-K2 + L2
c-GL2 := CPC + i-GL2
i-S2 := i-K2 + S2
i-SL2 := i-K2 + SL2
i-PLL2 := i-S2 + C42
i-mHC2 := i-S2 + CB2
i-KM2 := i-SL2 + CB2
i-KM.lin2 := i-KM2 + Lin2
42 is known to be derivable in i-GL2.
In the provability logic literature:
• N2 is known as L1,
• K2 is known as L2,
• 42 is known as L3,
• L2 is known as L4.
• The axioms of i-GL2 (intuitionistic Lo¨b logic) and c-GL2 (classical Lo¨b
logic) are well-known. The logic c-GL2 is arithmetically complete for
all classical Σ01-sound theories extending Elementary Arithmetic EA. The
logic i-GL2 is arithmetically valid in all arithmetical theories extending
i-EA. We discuss these matters further in § 5.3.
• The principle Lei is known as Leivant’s Principle. The principle is, in a
sense, a shadow of the disjunction property. The disjunction property of
an arithmetical theory T cannot be verified in T itself. Leivant’s Principle
is arithmetically valid in a substantial class of arithmetical theories that
includes Heyting Arithmetic HA. We discuss Leivant’s Principle in § 5.3.
• S2 axiomatizes strong modalities (cf. § 7), but arises also in some arith-
metically motivated logics (§ 5.4.4). Strong Lo¨b logic is obtained by adding
S2 to i-GL2—or, alternatively, by using SL2 instead of L2 as an axiom.
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• The principle C42 classically corresponds to a semantic condition known
as density (cf. Figure 6.2). From another point of view, this axiom arises
naturally in the Curry-Howard logic of monads (§ 7). It is a typical “non-
Lo¨b-like” axiom: in combination with L2, we could derive 2⊥.
• CB2 comes from the intuitionistic system i-KM2 of Kuznetsov and Murav-
itsky and its later weakening to i-mHC2 by Esakia and the Tbilisi group
(see [Lit14] for more information and references); its equivalent variant
CB′2 (see Lemma 4.16a) was discussed [Vis82] in connection with PA
∗
(§ 5.4.4). In our setting, it is interesting to contrast it with CBa in Table
4.2 (Figure 6.2 and Example 6.11). See also § 8.2 for the arithmetical
perspective on the contrast between i-mHC2 and i-mHCa.
The name CB used here comes from Litak [Lit14], where it was used to
suggest the Cantor-Bendixson derivative.
• Lin2 is a typical axiom valid on total orders. In Fact 4.18 and Example
6.12, we compare and contrast this axiom with its J-counterpart.
4.1.2. Logics in LJ
Table 4.2 displays potential axioms for J central for this paper. Most of them
come with an explicit arithmetical interpretation. Typically, the “primed” vari-
ants of axioms will be their equivalent reformulations (§ 4.2).
• Iemhoff [Iem01b; Iem03; IDZ05] identified system iA as the logic of all
(finite) frames satisfying the J-p condition; this and other completeness
results are discussed in § 6. However, Di is an axiom which is not exactly
trivial from an arithmetical point of view. It does hold in the preservativity
logic of Heyting Arithmetic but it fails in the preservativity logic of Peano
Arithmetic (§ 5.4 and Appendix B). The non-triviality of Di, and the
potential interest in a disjunction-free system (§ 7) are the reasons why
we isolated iA− as a subsystem.
• The principles 4a, Wa, Ma are arithmetically valid for the preservativity
interpretation of J. This means that they are in the logic i-PreL− which is
arithmetically valid in all arithmetical theories we consider in this paper
(§ 5.4). The principle La, weaker than Wa, is mainly of technical interest.
• If we interpret φ J ψ as ¬ψ¬φ, then the principle Pa is the distinctive
principle of the interpretability logic of finitely axiomatized extensions of
EA+ aka I∆0 + Supexp. The modality  stands for interpretability over a
theory. This modality is explained in § C.20 The specific result mentioned
here is discussed in detail in § C.3.
20On a side note, some CS readers may be familiar with the use of triangle-like notation
like  for unary modalities in the context of guarded (co)recursion discussed in § 7.2. The
tradition of using such notation for binary operators and connectives such as arithmetical
interpretability is much longer and we believe this convention to be more natural.
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Table 4.2: List of principles for J and logics considered in this paper.
Na ` φ→ ψ ⇒ ` φ J ψ
Tr φ J ψ → ψ J χ→ φ J χ
Ka φ J ψ → φ J χ→ φ J (ψ ∧ χ)
K′a φ J ψ → (φ ∧ χ) J (ψ ∧ χ)
K′′a φ J ψ → φ J (ψ → χ)→ φ J χ
K′′′a φ J (ψ → χ)→ (φ ∧ ψ) J χ
BL 2(φ→ ψ)→ φ J ψ
LB φ J ψ → 2φ→ 2ψ
Di φ J χ→ ψ J χ→ (φ ∨ ψ) J χ
Di′ φ J ψ → (φ ∨ χ) J (ψ ∨ χ)
Pa φ J ψ → 2(φ J ψ)
4a φ J 2φ
La (2φ→ φ) J φ
Wa (φ ∧ 2ψ) J ψ → φ J ψ
W′a φ J ψ → (2ψ → φ) J ψ
Ma φ J ψ → (2χ→ φ) J (2χ→ ψ)
M′a (φ ∧ 2χ) J ψ → φ J (2χ→ ψ)
Sa (φ→ ψ)→ φ J ψ
S′a φ J ψ → φ→ 2ψ
Box φ J ψ → 2(φ→ ψ)
Box′ (χ ∧ φ) J ψ → χ J (φ→ ψ)
Box′′ φ J ψ → (χ→ φ) J (χ→ ψ)
CBa φ J ψ → (φ→ ψ) ∨ φ
Lina φ J ψ ∨ ψ J φ
Appa (φ ∧ (φ J ψ)) J ψ
C4a 2φ J φ
Hug (φ→ 2ψ)→ (φ J ψ)
Everywhere below, when we write i-X ?, the
superscript “?” can be either “−” or nothing,
depending whether or not Di is used.
iA0 := IPC + Na + Tr,
iA− := iA0 + Ka,
iA := iA− + Di,
i-GLa
? := iA? + La,
i-GWa
? := iA? + Wa,
i-PreL? := i-GWa
? + Ma.
For each logic i-X ?, i-SX ? denotes its exten-
sion with S2, in particular
i-SA := iA + S2.
Set also:
i-PLAA := i-SA + C4a,
i-mHCa := i-SA + CBa,
i-KMa := i-mHCa + L2,
i-KM.lina := i-KMa + Lina,
For each logic i-X , i-BoxX denotes its exten-
sion with Box, e.g.,
i-BoxA := iA + Box,
i-BoxGLa := i-GLa + Box.
Note that i-BoxGLa is just a notational vari-
ant of i-GL2. Note also that notation
i-BoxX− would be redundant, see Lemma
4.4c. A fortiori, the same applies to exten-
sions of i-mHCa by Lemma 4.16c. Similarly,
i-PLAA− would be redundant by Lemma
4.17g. In all these systems, Di can be derived
from the remaining axioms. Furthermore, as
we will show in Lemma 4.19, i-KM.lina and
i-KM.lin2 are notational variants of the same
system.
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• Sa and S′a are J-variants axiomatize the same logic as S2(Lemma 4.10). In
general, this is rarely the case with J-generalizations of 2-axioms; often
the J-version is stronger, but Lina illustrates such a rule is not universal.
• We have already seen Box in § 3 above; its equivalence with Box′ and
Box′′ is established in Lemma 4.4. The conjunction of this axiom with
BL, derivable in iA (Lemma 4.1c), collapses J. Note that CBa makes Box
derivable (Lemma 4.16), unlike CB2 (Example 6.11).
• The last group of J-principles—i.e., Appa, C4a and Hug—which should
be contrasted with C42, will play a prominent roˆle in § 7.1 on monads,
idioms and arrows in functional programming. For similar reasons as
C42, they are of drastically “anti-Lo¨b” character, a fact made explicit by
their semantic correspondents displayed in Figure 6.2 in § 6. It is worth
mentioning that Appa was in fact adopted by Lewis as an axiom even in
his weakest system S1, cf. Remark 7.3.
4.2. An armful of derivations
In this subsection we put the Hilbert-systems proposed above to actual use.
We begin with a discussion of minimal axiom systems, with and without Ka
or Di. Later on, we move to those inspired by concrete applications. We are
not giving the details of these derivations here; some are available in existing
references (and we give references in several cases), some are left for the reader
as an exercise, and some will be published in future work [LV].
For a calculus X defined by a list of axioms and rules, write X ` φ to denote
deducibility from all substitution instances of axioms/rules in X plus Modus
Ponens. Whenever we have that for any φ, Y ` φ implies X ` φ, we write
X ` Y. For X ` φ → ψ, iA0 ` φ → ψ, iA− ` φ → ψ or iA ` φ → ψ (see
Table 4.2 below), write, respectively, φ `X ψ, φ `0 ψ, φ `− ψ and φ `∨ ψ. In
other words, we use `− (and `X−) for derivability without instances of non-IPC
schemes involving disjunction (Di or equivalently Di′) and `0 for a still more
restrictive case when deduction relies on monotonicity only. Correspondingly,
interderivability (equivalence) is denoted using, respectively a`, a`X , a`0, a`−
and a`∨. Also, let us abbreviate X ` φ J ψ, iA0 ` φ J ψ, iA− ` φ J ψ or
iA ` φ J ψ as, respectively, φ |JX ψ, φ |J0 ψ, φ |J− ψ and φ |J∨ ψ. Note
that even the weakest of these relations, i.e., |J0 is transitive and contains `0; in
fact, this is precisely essence of the minimal deduction system iA0. Finally, for
deductions in 2-only language, using i-K2 as the minimal system, one can use
similar conventions as above with 2 as subscript (e.g, “`2” and “a`2”).
4.2.1. Axiomatizations for minimal systems
Lemma 4.1.
a. The principles Ka, K
′
a, K
′′
a and K
′′′
a are equivalent over iA0.
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b. The principles Di and Di′ are equivalent over iA0.
c. iA0 ` BL and iA0 ` LB.
As noted in existing references (cf., e.g., [Iem01b, Chapter 3] or [IDZ05, Theorem
2.5]), there is some freedom in the choice of minimal rules:
Fact 4.2. iA− a` IPC + N2 + K2 + Tr + Ka.
Open Question 4.3. Even in the absence of intuitionistic , the negation-
free logic obtained by replacing→ with J is a subintuitionistic logic [Cor87;
Dosˇ93; CJ01; CJ05]. Is there a good a presentation of the minimal logic
of J in terms of fusion or dovetailing/fibring of IPC and this minimal
subintuitionistic logic, rather analogous to the logic of bunched implications
BI [OP99; Pym02; POY04]? Note that the analogy with BI is limited, e.g.,
both local and global consequence relations of J in the absence of → cease
to be protoalgebraic [CJ01; CJ05].
4.2.2. Collapsing and decomposing J
In Fact 3.4, we have observed that there are two syntactically similar condi-
tions one can use to enforce brilliancy. Now we can prove syntactically their
equivalence, which explains why we used the seemingly weaker one as Box:
Lemma 4.4.
a. i-BoxA− a` iA + Box′, i.e., Box and Box′ are equivalent over iA−.
b. i-BoxA− a` iA + Box′′, i.e., Box and Box′′ are equivalent over iA−.
c. i-BoxA− ` Di and consequently i-BoxX a` i-BoxX− for any X .
Remark 4.5. We presented one possible way to translate a J-logic i-X into a
2-logic, to wit to take φ J ψ as an abbreviation for 2(φ→ ψ). This translation
relates i-X to its extension i-BoxX , which is term-equivalent to a 2-logic. An-
other way, studied in detail by Iemhoff and coauthors [Iem01b; Iem03; IDZ05],
takes the validity of LB as a starting point and translates φ J ψ as 2φ→ 2ψ. A
third interpretation of J in terms of 2 relating i-PLL2 and i-PLAA is discussed
in Remark 7.2; it builds on a i-PLAA-decomposition of J in terms of→ provided
by Lemma 4.17f. For more on reductions of J to unary modalities see [LV].
We have suggested that the degeneration of J in the presence of classical laws
can be derived syntactically. In fact, this can be obtained as a consequence
of an equivalence derivable over the intuitionistic base but, atypically, using
disjunction with its Di axiom in an essential way:
Lemma 4.6. We have: ψ J χ a`∨ (ψ ∨ ¬ψ) J (ψ → χ).
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Nevertheless, as (ψ ∨ ¬ψ) J (ψ → χ) is parametric in the antecedent of strict
implication, it does not seem a satisfying reduction of J to →. Let us also note
in passing that if one adds J to Johansson’s minimal logic instead of IPC, even
this transformation does not work anymore. Moreover, there is no one-variable
formula φ(p) in the disjunction-free fragment of the intuitionistic signature s.t.
p J q a`− φ(p) J (p→ q) and CPC ` φ(p), cf. Example 6.10.
Open Question 4.7. In general, we stick to extensions of L, but let us
make a digression concerning a language without all standard connectives.
Suppose we define [φ]ψ as (φ ∨ ¬φ) J ψ. As we saw above, φ J ψ is
equivalent with [φ](φ → ψ). Is there an elegant axiomatization for the
minimal fragment of the language with [·](·)? It seems richer than the
disjunction-free fragment of LJ.
Corollary 4.8. iA + em ` i-BoxA.
Remark 4.9. This is one of very few places in this section where we need full
iA rather than iA−, i.e., where Di is used in an essential way. This happens for
a very good reason: it is not possible to derive i-BoxA from iA− + em. One can
see this, e.g., by considering the interpretation of φ J ψ as 2φ→ 2ψ.
In Appendix B we will explain that the logic ILM of Π01-conservativity and in-
terpretability corresponds to c-PreL := i-PreL− + em. This provides a proof that
even c-PreL does not extend i-BoxA. The proof may use either the arithmetical
interpretation or the Veltman semantics used for ILM.
We will discuss collapsing and decomposing further in a later paper [LV]; see
also remarks preceding Theorem 6.6 below.
4.2.3. Derivations between arithmetical principles
We turn our attention to derivations between principles of central importance,
especially from the point of view of arithmetical interpretations.
Lemma 4.10. We have:
a. i-SA− a` iA− + Sa, i.e., over iA−, the principles S2 and Sa are equivalent.
b. i-SA− a` iA− + S′a, i.e., over iA−, the principles S2 and S′a are equivalent.
c. In the presence of Sa, Na is derivable using just Modus Ponens.
Hence, axiomatizations of “strength” in terms of 2 and in terms of J yield
the same logic over iA−. As we are going to see below, this is a relatively rare
phenomenon. Still, many well-known modal derivations can be easily translated
into the J-setting, e.g., a derivation of 4 from the Lo¨b axiom:
Lemma 4.11. i-GL−a a` iA− + L2 + 4a. It follows that, over iA− + 4a, the
principles L2 and La are interderivable.
Lemma 4.12.
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a. iA− + 4a ` 42.
b. i-SA− ` 4a.
c. i-SA− ` Pa.
d. i-SA− + L2 ` i-GL−a .
Lemma 4.13. [IDZ05, Cor. 2.6 and 2.7] Wa and W
′
a are equivalent over iA
−
0 .
Similarly, Ma and M
′
a are equivalent over iA
−
0 .
Lemma 4.14. We have:
a. i-GW−a ` i-GL−a .
b. i-GL−a + Ma `Wa. In other words, i-PreL− a` i-GL−a + Ma.
c. i-GL−a + Pa `Wa.
d. iA− + Ma ` (2φ J ψ)→ 2(2φ→ ψ).
Examples 6.7, 6.8 and 6.9 illustrate that clauses (a) and (b) cannot be reversed.
Lemma 4.15. iA + 4a ` Lei.
This implies that the logics i-GLa, i-GWa and i-PreL are not conservative over
i-GL2. Both i-GLa and i-GWa are conservative over i-GL2 + Lei [IDZ05].
4.2.4. More derivations
Derivations discussed in the remainder of this section are mostly of importance
in § 7, although, e.g., Lemma 4.16a will be also relevant in § 5.4.4:
Lemma 4.16. We have:
a. i-K2
− + CB2 a`2 i-K2− + CB′2
b. iA− + CBa ` CB2.
c. i-mHCa
− ` Box and consequently i-mHCa− ` Di.
d. i-mHCa ` Ma.
e. i-KMa `Wa.
Clause (c) implies that the notation “i-mHCa
−” is redundant. Example 6.11
below illustrates that clause (b) cannot be reversed.
Lemma 4.17. We have:
a. iA− + C4a ` C42.
b. iA− + Appa ` C4a.
c. iA− + Hug ` C4a.
d. i-PLAA− ` Appa.
e. i-PLAA− ` Hug.
f. φ J ψ a`i-PLAA− φ→ 2ψ
g. i-PLAA− ` Di.
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Example 6.13 illustrates irreversibility of several clauses in this lemma. So far,
principles involving J tended to be stronger than their relatives formulated in
L2. It is indeed quite often but not always the case. For example, in the case
of “semi-linearity” axioms, the situation is reversed:
Fact 4.18. We have:
• iA− + Lin2 ` Lina.
• i-BoxA + Lina ` Lin2, in particular i-mHCa + Lina ` Lin2.
It is hard to make Lina and Lin2 coincide in the absence of Box, cf. Example
6.12. Nevertheless, here is an important exception, used in § 7.2 below:
Lemma 4.19. We have:
a. (2φ→ 2ψ)→ 2(φ→ ψ) `0 Box.
b. i-KM.lin2 ` (2φ→ 2ψ)→ 2(φ→ ψ).
c. i-KM.lin2 a` i-KM.lina. That is, not only both systems are notational variants
of each other, but the Box axiom can be derived from i-KM.lin2.
5. Arithmetical interpretations: provability and preservativity «
In § 6 we continue the discussion of the modal side of our calculi. But now,
we cannot postpone any further the presentation of our original motivation for
studying constructive J and a number of its axiom systems in terms of Σ01-
preservativity for an arithmetical theory T :
• A JT B if, for all Σ01-sentences S, if T ` S → A, then T ` S → B.
In order to provide a framework for such interpretations of modal connectives,
we introduce the notion of a schematic logic. This notion can be given a very
general treatment. However, for the purposes of this paper, we will restrict
ourselves to the case of arithmetical theories, studying propositional logics of
theories (§ 5.2), provability logics (§ 5.3) and our true target: preservativity
logics (§ 5.4). For an instructive contrast, we provide some extra information
about logics for Π01-conservativity and interpretability in Appendices B and C.
5.1. Schematic logics
An arithmetical theory T is, for the purposes of this paper, an extension of
i-EA, the intuitionistic version of Elementary Arithmetic, in the arithmetical
language.21 We demand that the axiom set of T is given by a ∆0(exp)-formula.
21The classical theory EA is I∆0 + Exp. This theory consists of the basic axioms for zero,
successor, addition, multiplication plus ∆0-induction plus the axiom that states that exponen-
tiation is total. The theory i-EA is the same theory only with constructive logic as underlying
logic. The theory proves the decidability of ∆0(exp)-formulas. Some basic information about
constructive arithmetic can be found in [TD88; Tro73; Dra88].
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Let L}0,...,}k−1 be the language extending L with operators }0, . . . , }k−1,
where }i has arity ni. Let a function F be given that assigns to every }i an
arithmetical formula A(v0, . . . , vni−1), where all free variables are among the
variables shown. We write }i,F (B0, . . . , Bni−1) for F (}i)(pB0q, . . . , pBni−1q).
Here pCq is the numeral of the Go¨del number of C. Suppose f is a mapping from
the propositional atoms to arithmetical sentences. We define (φ)fF as follows:
• (p)fF := f(p)
• (·)fF commutes with the propositional connectives
• (}i(φ0, . . . , φni−1))fF := }i,F ((φ0)
f
F , . . . , (φni−1)
f
F )
Let T be an arithmetical theory. We say that a modal formula in our given
signature is T -valid w.r.t. F if, for all assignments f of arithmetical sentences
to the propositional atoms, we have T ` (φ)fF . We write ΛT,F for the set of
modal formulas that are T -valid w.r.t. F . Of course, we will focus exclusively
on “natural” F yielding well-behaved ΛT,F with interesting properties.
5.2. Propositional logics of a theory
Let us first consider the case where our finite set of modal operators is empty.
If T is consistent and classical, then ΛT := ΛT,∅ is, trivially, precisely CPC and
if T is Heyting Arithmetic (HA), then ΛT has the de Jongh property : ΛT = IPC.
There are theories for which ΛT is an intermediate logic strictly between IPC
and CPC. De Jongh, Verbrugge & Visser [JVV11] show that whenever Θ is an
intermediate logic with the finite frame property (cf. § 6) and U is the result of
extending HA with all axioms of Θ as schemes, ΛU = Θ.
For some theories like Markov’s Arithmetic MA = HA + MP + ECT0, where
MP is the Markov’s Principle ([TD88, 4.5, p.203], [Tro73, 1.11.5, p.93]):
(∀x(Ax ∨ ¬Ax) ∧ ¬¬∃xAx)→ ∃xAx.
and ECT0 is the Extended Church’s Thesis (cf. Appendix A), the characteriza-
tion of the set of valid principles is an open problem connected to the question
of the propositional logic of realizability. See e.g. [Pli09, § 13]. For more on
intuitionistic schematic logics see [Smo73; Vis99; Pli09; JVV11; AM14].
5.3. Provability Logic
Next we consider the extension of propositional logic with a unary modal op-
erator 2. It allows numerous interesting arithmetical interpretations, but at
this point we focus on the interpretation of 2 as provability. Consider any
arithmetical theory T . We assume that T comes equipped with a ∆0(exp)-
predicate αT that gives the codes of its axiom set. Let provability in T be
arithmetized by provT . We note that T really occurs in the guise of αT . We
set F0,T (2) := provT(v0). Let Λ
∗
T := ΛT,F0,T . Intuitionistic Lo¨b’s Logic i-GL2
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is contained in all Λ∗T , where T is an arithmetical theory in the sense of this
paper. This insight is due to Lo¨b [Lo¨b55].22
Remark 5.1. In many treatments of intuitionistic modal logic the interdefin-
ability of 2 and 3 fails and 2 and 3 both are treated as primitive operations.
This is not so in the context of provability logic for constructive theories and its
extensions. Here the connective 3 is always defined as ¬2¬. Thus, 2, which
signals the existence of a proof, is the positive notion and 3 is the negative less
informative notion. We note that ¬3¬ is equivalent to ¬¬2¬¬ which, in the
context of theories like HA, is certainly weaker than 2.
Remark 5.2. One of the first global insights into schematic theories is due
to George Gargov [Gar84]: they inherit the disjunction property from the un-
derlying arithmetic theory. Thus, if an extension of i-EA has the disjunction
property, then so has its provability logic.23
The theory c-GL2 is obtained by extending i-GL2 with classical logic. If T is
a Σ10-sound classical theory, then Λ
∗
T = c-GL2. This insight is due to Solovay
[Sol76]. In contrast, the logic i-GL2 is not complete for HA. The system for
preservativity logic i-PreL+V discussed in § 5.4 derives many more arithmetically
valid principles for the provability logic of HA underivable in i-GL2, e.g.,
• 2¬¬2φ→ 22φ.
• 2(¬¬2φ→ 2φ)→ 22φ
• 2(φ ∨ ψ)→ 2(φ ∨2ψ). (Lei)
We note that the first principle is a consequence of classical c-GL2, but the
second and third are not. This illustrates that Λ∗(·) is not monotonic. To make
this understandable, the reader may note that we both change the theory and
the interpretation of the modal operator.
Note that substituting 2⊥ for φ and ¬2⊥ for ψ in Lei yields
` 2(2⊥ ∨ ¬2⊥) → 2(2⊥ ∨2¬2⊥)
→ 2(2⊥ ∨2⊥)
→ 22⊥
Hence, adding Lei to c-GL2 yields 22⊥, i.e., Leivant’s principle is ‘weakly in-
consistent’ with classical logic over i-GL2.
22Three remarks are in order. The fact that Lo¨b’s Principle follows from Lo¨b’s work was
noted by Leon Henkin who was the referee of Lo¨b’s paper. Secondly, Lo¨b’s proof of Lo¨b’s
Principle is fully constructive and goes through even in constructive versions of S12. Thirdly,
Kripke’s proof of Lo¨b’s Principle from the Second Incompleteness Theorem is not constructive
—even if we give the Second Incompleteness Theorem the form: if a theory proves its own
consistency then it is inconsistent.
23Interestingly, Gargov’s argument itself uses classical logic.
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We write Λ Λ′ for the closure of Λ ∪ Λ′ under modus ponens. Our insight
above yields: c-GL2 + 22⊥ ⊆ Λ∗HA  Λ∗PA. In fact, by Theorem 5.3, we have:
Λ∗HA  Λ∗PA = c-GL2 +22⊥.
Theorem 5.3 (Silly Upperbound). We have:
(22⊥ → ¬¬2⊥) 6∈ Λ∗T iff Λ∗T ⊆ c-GL2 +22⊥.
Our proof presupposes knowledge of the proof of Solovay’s Theorem. The proof
can be skipped since nothing but the Silly Upperbound rests on it.
Proof. “→” Suppose φ ∈ Λ∗T and c-GL2 + 22⊥ 0 φ. Then there is a counter
Kripke model of depth 2 to φ, say with nodes 0,. . . , n− 1 and root 0. We have
i < j iff i = 0 and j > 0. Let T+ be T plus 2T2T⊥ plus sentential excluded
third. We work in T+. We define a Solovay function in the usual way:
• h0 := 0
• h(p+ 1) :=
{
i if h(p) < i and proofT (p, p` 6= iq)
h(p) otherwise
Here ` is the limit of h.
We note that, since 2T2T⊥ we have 2T
∨
0<j<n ∃xhx = j. This tells us that
inside the box, we can indeed prove that the limit exists. Moreover we have
excluded third for sentences of the form ` = i. Outside the box we can also
prove the existence of the limit by sentential excluded third. Using these two
observations we can execute the usual Solovay argument. This gives us 2T⊥
and we may conclude that T ` 2T2T⊥ → ¬¬2T⊥.
“←” Suppose (22⊥ → ¬¬2⊥) ∈ Λ∗T and Λ∗T ⊆ c-GL2 + 22⊥. Then it would
follow that c-GL2 ` 22⊥ → 2⊥. Quod non. 2
Note that (22⊥ → ¬¬2⊥) 6∈ Λ∗T if T is one of HA, HA+MP, HA+ECT0. The
situation is different for T = HA∗ (cf. § 5.4.4).
We formulate the main question of constructive provability logic.
Open Question 5.4. What is the provability logic of HA? Is it decidable?
We note that the logic is prima facie Π02.
The basic information about classical provability logic can be found in [Smo85;
BS91; Boo93; Lin96; Jd98; Sˇve00; AB04; HV14]. For information about intu-
itionistic provability logic, see e.g. [Vis94; Iem01b; Iem01a; Vis08; AM14].
5.4. Preservativity Logic
As stated above, Σ01-preservativity [Vis85; Vis94; Vis02; Iem03; IDZ05] for a
theory T is defined as follows:
• A JT B if, for all Σ01-sentences S, if T ` S → A, then T ` S → B.
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In contrast to Π01-conservativity and interpretability (see Appendices B and C),
defining Σ01-preservativity does not require an inter-theory notion T J U .
We give a characterization of Σ01-preservativity that is analogous to the Orey-
Ha´jek characterization for interpretability over PA. Suppose T extends HA. We
write 2T,n for the arithmetization of provability from the axioms of T with
Go¨del number ≤ n. The theory T is, HA-verifiably, essentially reflexive: for all
n and A, we have T ` 2T,nA→ A. Here we allow parameters in the formulation
of the reflection principle.24
Theorem 5.5. Suppose T is an extension of HA. Then, A JT B iff, for all n,
T ` 2T,nA→ B. This result is verifiable in i-EA.
Proof. “→” Suppose A JT B. It follows that (a) if T ` 2T,nA → A, then (b)
T ` 2T,nA→ B. Now note that (a) follows from essential reflexivity.
“←” Suppose (c) for all n, T ` 2T,nA → B and (d) T ` S → A. From (d),
we have, for some m, that T ` 2T,m(S → A). We choose m so large that
the finite axiomatization of i-EA has Go¨del number ≤ m. By i-EA verifiable Σ01-
completeness of extensions of i-EA, T ` S → 2T,mA. Hence, by (c), T ` S → B.
The verifiability in i-EA can be seen by inspection of the above proof. 2
5.4.1. i-PreL− and i-PreL
We note that > JHA A is i-EA-provably equivalent to 2HAA. This means that
in our study of Σ01-preservativity logic of arithmetical theories, we can treat 2
as a defined connective and focus on LJ. Let F1,T (J) := pT (v0, v1), where pT
is a good arithmetization of the relation A JT B. We define Λ◦T := ΛT,F1,T .
The principles of i-PreL− are arithmetically valid for all arithmetical theories in
our sense, to wit all ∆0(exp)-axiomatized theories in the arithmetical language
extending i-EA. However, i-PreL = i-PreL− + Di is valid for a more restricted
group. We need the notion of closure under q-realizability : T ` A implies there
is an n such that T ` n·ε↓ ∧ n · ε q˜ A (cf. Appendix A for notation). A sufficient
condition for Di to hold is that T is not only closed under q-realizability, but it
also verifies this fact.
Theorem 5.6. Suppose T is T -provably closed under q-realizability. Then Di
is arithmetically valid in T , i.e., Di is in Λ◦T .
24This result is folklore. We could not locate a fully worked-out proof in the literature. Some
ingredients can be found in [Tro73, Part I, §5], but the treatment of these ingredients contains
some gaps. The proof looks as follows. The theory HA verifies cut-elimination for predicate
logic. Consider any n. Reason in T . Suppose 2T,nA. Let p be a cut-free witness of 2T,nA. All
formulas occurring in p will have complexity ≤ m, for some standard m. Here our complexity
measure is depth of logical connectives. We can develop a partial satisfaction predicate for
formulas of complexity ≤ m that HA-verifiably satisfies the commutation conditions. The
standard axioms of T that have Go¨del number ≤ n are true (in the sense of our satisfaction
predicate), since the Tarski bi-conditionals are derivable. By induction, we can show that all
m-derivations from true axioms yield true conclusions. So, a fortiori, we have A.
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Proof. We write J for JT and 2 for 2T .
Suppose T is T -provably closed under q-realizability. We reason in T . Suppose
(a) A J C and (b) B J C. Suppose 2(S → (A∨B)), where S is a Σ01-sentence.
By q-realizability and the fact that Σ01-sentences are self-realizing, we can find a
recursive index e of a 0-ary, 0,1-valued function, such that (c) 2(S → e ·ε ↓), (d)
2((e ·ε = 0∧S)→ A) and (e) 2((e ·ε = 1∧S)→ B). From (a) and (d), we get:
(f) 2((e · ε = 0∧ S)→ C). From (b) and (e) we get (g) 2((e · ε = 1∧ S)→ C).
From (c), (f) and (g), we obtain 2(S → C). 2
The following salient theories T are T -provably (even i-EA-provably) closed un-
der q-realizability: HA, HA+MP, HA+ECT0, MA = HA+MP+ECT0 and HA
∗
(see § 5.4.4), hence i-PreL is arithmetically valid in them.
Open Question 5.7. It would be interesting to have a more perspicuous
condition for the satisfaction of Di than closure under q-realizability.
Moreover, in many cases we can also prove Di using the de Jongh transla-
tion. Are there separating examples where either q-realizability works and
the de Jongh translation does not or where the de Jongh translation works
but q-realizability does not?
5.4.2. The Preservativity Logic of HA
The logic i-PreL is incomplete for HA [Vis94; Iem03]. Define:
• (χ)(σ) := σ for σ ::= > | ⊥ | (> J φ) | (σ ∨ σ), where φ ranges over the
full language.
• (χ)(φ ∧ ψ) := ((χ)(φ) ∧ (χ)(ψ)),
• (χ)(φ) := (χ→ φ) in all other cases.
The following principle is arithmetically valid over HA.
V For χ :=
∧
i<n(φi → ψi), we have:
` (χ→ (φn ∨ φn+1)) J
∨
j<n+2(χ)(φj).
An example of a consequence of V is as follows. Consider any non-modal propo-
sitional formula φ(p) with at most p free. Suppose that φ(p) is not constructively
valid. Then, the principle φ(2ψ) J (2ψ∨¬2ψ) is arithmetically valid over HA.
Remark 5.8. We have the following salient result about the admissible rules
of HA. Suppose φ and ψ are non-modal propositional formulas. Define:
• φ ∼HA ψ if for all arithmetical substitutions σ we have:
HA ` σ(φ) ⇒ HA ` σ(ψ).
The following are equivalent:
(i) φ ∼HA ψ, (ii) i-PreL + V ` φ J ψ, (iii) i-PreL + V ` 2φ→ 2ψ.
See [Iem03] in combination with [Vis94].
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Is i-PreL + V the preservativity logic of HA? We do not think so. The second
author has discovered a valid scheme that does not appear to be derivable from
i-PreL + V. To save space, we postpone a detailed discussion to future work.
Open Question 5.9. Here is a list of more open problems.
I. Is i-PreL− the preservativity logic of all extensions of i-EA?
In other words, is i-PreL− the intersection of all Λ◦T , where T is an
arithmetical extension of i-EA?
II. Is i-PreL− the preservativity logic of all extensions of HA?
III. Is there an extension T of i-EA such that Λ◦T = i-PreL
−?
IV. Is there an extension T of HA such that Λ◦T = i-PreL
−?
V. Is there an extension T of i-EA such that Λ◦T = i-PreL?
VI. Is there an extension T of HA such that Λ◦T = i-PreL?
VII. What is the preservativity logic of HA?
VIII. What is the preservativity logic of HA + MP?
IX. What is the preservativity logic of HA + ECT0?
The questions VII, VIII, IX are obviously quite difficult.a As far as we
know nobody has seriously worked on questions I–VI.
aThey could be easier than the question what the provability logic of HA, HA + MP
or HA + ECT0 is. Sometimes theories in a richer language are easier to manage.
5.4.3. The Preservativity Logic of classical theories
We know a lot about the preservativity logic of classical theories, since JT
can be intertranslated with Π01-conservativity IT in the classical case. As a
consequence we can translate what we know about the logic of Π01-conservativity
to a result about preservativity logic. Let c-PreL := i-PreL− + em.
Theorem 5.10. Suppose that T is Σ01-sound classical theory that extends IΠ
−
1 +
Exp. Then, the preservativity logic of T is precisely c-PreL.
This result is a translation of Theorem 12 of [BV05], which is a strengthening
of the main result of [HM90], the latter in turn being an adaptation of [Sha88]
and [Ber90]. For details see Appendix B.
5.4.4. HA∗ and PA∗
The Completeness Principle for a theory T is defined as
CPT A→ 2TA.
26
Here A is allowed to contain parameters. Consider any theory T such that T
is HA + CPT . Such a theory is easily constructed by the Fixed Point Lemma.
One can show that, if HA verifies that T is HA+CPT , then T is unique modulo
provable equivalence. Thus, the following definition is justified: HA∗ is the
unique theory such that, HA-verifiably, HA∗ is HA + CPHA∗ . The theory HA∗
was introduced and studied in [Vis82].
We have a second way of access to HA∗ via a variant of Go¨del’s translation
of IPC in S4. We define:
• Ag := A if A is atomic.
• (·)g commutes with ∧, ∨ and ∃.
• (B → C)g := ((Bg → Cg) ∧2HA(Bg → Cg)).
• (∀xB)g := (∀xBg ∧2HA∀xBg).
We have HA∗ ` A iff HA ` Ag. Using the translation (·)g on can show that HA∗is
conservative over HA with respect to formulas that have only Σ1-formulas as
antecedents of implications.
The theory HA∗ is the theory in which the incompleteness phenomena lie most
closely to the logical surface. We have the strong form of Lo¨b’s Principle HA∗ `
(2HA∗A → A) → A. Note that HA∗ ` ¬¬2HA∗⊥ is a special case. We are
inclined to read this principle as: inconsistency can never be excluded.
If we extend PA to U = PA+CPU , we end up with the inglorious U ` 2U⊥.
However, HA∗ is conservative over HA for a wide class of formulas. So, the
Completeness Principle is an example of a kind of extension that makes no real
sense in the classical case.
The theory HA∗ can be used to provide easy proofs of the independence of KLS
(Kreisel-Lacombe-Schoenfield) and MS (Myhill-Shepherdson) from HA [Vis82],
simplifying the original ones by Beeson [Bee75] while preserving their basic idea.
De Jongh and Visser showed that every prime recursively enumerable Heyt-
ing algebra on finitely many generators can be embedded in the Heyting algebra
of HA∗. See [JV96]. Their proof is an adaptation of a proof by Shavrukov [Sha93]
in the simplified form due to Zambella [Zam94] concerning the embeddability
of Magari algebras in the Magari algebra of Peano Arithmetic.
A consequence of the De Jongh-Visser result is the fact that the admissible
propositional rules for HA∗ are precisely the derivable rules. In contrast, the
admissible propositional rules for HA are the same as the admissible rules for
IPC: this is the maximal set of admissible rules that is possible for a theory with
the de Jongh property. Thus among theories with the de Jongh property both
the minimal possible set of admissible rules and the maximal one are exemplified.
See also [Vis99].
We want to show that HA∗ is HA-verifiably closed under q-realizability. The
easiest route is via the notion of self-q-realizability. A formula A(~x) (with all
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free variables shown) is self-q-realizing if there is a number sA such that
HA ` A(~x)→ (sA · (~x)) q˜ A(~x), cf. Appendix A for notation.
A substantial class of i-EA-verifiably self-q-realizing formulas is the class of
auto-q formulas given as follows. Let S range over all Σ01-formulas, let A range
over all formulas and let v range over all variables:
• B ::= S | (B ∧B) | ∀v B | (A→ B)
We note that the class of auto-q formulas substantially extends the almost
negative formulas that are self-r-realising.
The instances of the completeness scheme have the form ∀~x (A(~x)→ S(~x)),
where S is Σ01. Thus, these instances are auto-q. It follows that HA
∗ is HA-
verifiably closed under q-realizability. Thus, i-PreL∗ := iA + SL2 + Ma is con-
tained in the preservativity logic of HA∗, to wit Λ◦HA∗ . There are examples of
valid principles that are most probably not in i-PreL∗. We do not know whether
this has any traces in the provability logic of HA∗. As will be explained in
Remark C.3, there is a certain analogy between HA + CT0! and HA
∗.
We turn to the theory PA∗, axiomatized by the set α of all sentences A such
that PA ` Ag. One can easily show that α is closed under deduction and that
PA∗ satisfies CPHA∗ .25 The theory PA∗ verifies the Trace Principle :
TP 2PA∗∀x (Ax→ Bx)→ (∃xAx ∨ ∀x (Ax→ Bx)).
This principle is equivalent to
2PA∗∀xBx→ (∃xAx ∨ ∀x (Ax→ Bx)).
The presence of the trace principle has as a modal consequence the principle
CB2 2φ→ ((ψ → φ) ∨ ψ)
In [Vis82], it is shown that the logic i-KM2 is precisely the provability logic of
PA∗.26 We remind the reader that:
i-KM2 = i-SL2 + CB2 = i-GL2 + S2 + CB2.
The preservativity logic of PA∗ contains i-PreL− and Sa, but neither Di nor CBa
(§ 8.2).
6. Kripke completeness and correspondence ?
Apart from being our original motivation to study J, the arithmetical inter-
pretation can occasionally complement the deductive systems proposed in § 4
25We have demanded that the axiom set of a theory is ∆0(exp). The axioms of PA
∗ do not
satisfy this demand. So, the official axiom set should be a suitable ∆0(exp)-set manufactured
from α using a version of Craig’s trick.
26In [Vis82] the equivalent form CB′2 is used, cf. Lemma 4.16.
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by providing a route to disprove certain judgements of the form X ` φ, i.e., to
show non-derivability from suitable sets of axioms (namely, those valid in some
arithmetical interpretations):
Example 6.1. Interpreting φ J ψ as 2(φ → ψ) over HA yields iA + L2 + Ma.
This interpretation refutes 4a, La and a fortiori Wa. It follows that 4a is really
needed in Lemma 4.14b above to derive Wa.
To disprove more such judgements, we need to return to relational insights of
§ 3 and provide Kripke completeness and correspondence results. Most of this
section is based on work we will discuss in a parallel publication [LV].
6.1. Notions of completeness
Given a logic i-X , set Fram(i-X ) := {F | for any V, 〈F , V 〉  i-X}. Say that
i-X is (weakly) complete for (or with respect to) a class of frames K if it is
• sound wrt K, i.e., K ⊆ Fram(i-X ) and
• any α s.t i-X 6` α can be refuted in a model based on a frame from K.
We say that a condition (which may be expressed in a natural language or in a
formalized metalanguage like first- or second-order logic) corresponds to a given
J-logic i-X if it defines precisely Fram(i-X ). In particular, when a condition
is a correspondent of iA + φ, we say it corresponds to φ and correspondingly
(pun unintended) use notation Fram(φ). A logic i-X can be complete for much
smaller a class than Fram(i-X ) but if it is complete for some class of frames,
it is also complete for Fram(i-X ); we can thus take this as a definition what it
means to be (weakly) complete without additional qualifications. Incomplete
logics, i.e., those which have some non-theorems which cannot be refuted in
Fram(i-X ), are sometimes even encountered among those with an arithmetical
interpretation, c.f. systems known as GLB and GLP [Jap88; Boo93; HL16],
though most “naturally” defined logics tend to be complete.
Remark 6.2. Let us recall an important difference between completeness and
correspondence when it comes to combinations (conjunctions) of axioms. Clearly,
Fram(
∧
Γ) =
⋂
γ∈Γ
Fram(γ), so whenever α is a correspondent of φ and β is a cor-
respondent of ψ, α ∧ β is a correspondent of φ ∧ ψ. Nothing like this needs to
hold for completeness, even for a finitely axiomatizable logic. Completeness of
iA + φ and iA + ψ for frames defined, respectively, by α and β does not au-
tomatically imply that iA + φ + ψ is complete for α ∧ β—or, indeed, for any
class of frames whatsoever. This is why in Figure 6.2, Theorems 6.4 and 6.6
below we do not mention correspondence conditions for logics axiomatized by
conjunctions/combinations of axioms, but completeness results for such logics
need to be stated explicitly.
The notion of completeness can be refined further in two orthogonal directions.
One of them is the finite model property (fmp, also known as the finite frame
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Figure 6.2: Correspondence conditions. In this figure, and elsewhere in this paper, ; stands
for < and → stands for . Some names of principles are taken from Iemhoff and coauthors
[Iem01b; Iem03; IDZ05; Zho03], others come from our work to be published separately [LV].
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property) which simply means completeness wrt a class of finite frames. While
the fmp is a much stronger property than weak completeness, it is still rather
standard among most “natural” logics. It is not quite the case, however, with
another refinement of interest: the notion of strong completeness, i.e., complete-
ness for deductions from infinite sets of premises. This notion can be defined in
two different ways using either
• the relation Γ `i-X φ defined as “φ is deducible from Γ using all theorems
of i-X and Modus Ponens” or
• the relation Γ `Ji-X φ defined as “φ is deducible from Γ using all theorems
of i-X , Modus Ponens and the rule Na”.
A given J-logic i-X is then
• strongly locally complete if whenever Γ 6`i-X φ, there exists F ∈ Fram(i-X ),
a valuation V and a point k in F s.t. F , V, k  Γ and F , V, k 6 φ.
• strongly globally complete if whenever Γ 6`Ji-X φ, there exists F ∈ Fram(i-X ),
a valuation V s.t. F , V  Γ yet for some point k in F , F , V, k 6 φ.
As discovered by Frank Wolter [Wol93], these two notions coincide for Kripke
semantics of ordinary modal logics. While Wolter was not working with exten-
sions of iA, his reasoning extends to our setting:
Theorem 6.3. A J-logic i-X is strongly locally complete iff it is strongly globally
complete.
Strong completeness is typically achieved as a corollary of stronger results, such
as canonicity, which in turn, as first observed by Fine [Fin75] (see also Gehrke
et al. [GHV06] for a general treatment), can be obtained as a corollary of el-
ementarity : that is, being complete wrt a first-order definable class of frames.
It is not hard to see intuitively the reason for this connection: for a (weakly)
complete logic at least, a failure of strong completeness implies a failure of
compactness of the Kripke consequence relation, whereas being elementarily de-
finable guarantees compactness of this relation. A suitable notion of canonicity
for J-logics has been proposed and studied in the literature [Iem01b; Iem03;
Zho03]; in fact, clauses regarding strong completeness in Theorem 6.4 below are
corollaries of such canonicity results.
6.2. Completeness and correspondence results
Figure 6.2 lists various completeness/correspondence conditions for LJ-principles.
Lo¨b-like axioms tend to have counterparts which are not of first-order character,
but numerous others can in fact be expressed in first-order logic.
Let us turn these claims into proper theorems. First, let us summarize results
which are available in the existing literature, or can be relatively easily derived:
Theorem 6.4.
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a. iA is strongly complete (wrt the class of all frames) and enjoys the finite
model property [Iem01b, Prop. 4.1.1], [Iem03, Prop. 7], [Zho03, Th. 2.1.10].
b. i-BoxA = iA + Box corresponds to the class of brilliant frames, is strongly
complete and enjoys the finite model property.
c. i-SA = iA+S2 corresponds to the class of strong frames, is strongly complete
and enjoys the finite model property.
d. iA+42 corresponds to the class of semi-transitive frames, is strongly complete
and enjoys the finite model property.
e. iA+ 4a corresponds to the class of gathering frames, is strongly complete and
enjoys the finite model property [Iem01b, Prop. 4.2.1], [Iem03, Prop. 8].
f. iA + L2 corresponds to the class of Noetherian semi-transitive frames and
enjoys the finite model property [Iem01b, Prop. 4.3.2], [Zho03, Th. 2.2.7].
g. i-GLa = iA+L2+4a (cf. Lemma 4.11) corresponds to the class of Noetherian
gathering frames [Iem03, Lem. 9], [IDZ05, Lem. 3.10] and enjoys the finite
model property.
h. i-GWa = iA + Wa corresponds to the “supergathering” property of Figure 6.2
on the class of finite frames [Zho03, Lem. 3.5.1], [IDZ05, Th. 3.31].
i. iA+Ma corresponds to the class of Montagna frames of Figure 6.2, is strongly
complete [Iem03, Prop. 11] and enjoys the finite model property [IDZ05, Lem.
3.21], [Zho03, Th. 3.3.5].
We could not find in the literature an explicit statement of the finite model
property of i-PreL = i-GWa + Ma. Moreover, an astute reader probably noticed
that we do not claim strong completeness for all logics appearing in the state-
ment of this theorem. The reason is obvious: it is very well-known that variants
of the Lo¨b axiom clash with strong completeness and, a fortiori, with canonicity.
Boolos and Sambin [BS91] credit Fine and Rautenberg with this observation,
which can be now found in any standard monograph on modal logic. This can
be extended in several directions, e.g., to logics with weaker axioms (cf. Amer-
bauer [Ame96]) or to failure of broader notions of strong completeness [Lit05];
see Litak [Lit07, § 3] for more on both counts. In the context of logics for (rel-
ative) interpretability (cf. Appendix C), problems with canonicity and strong
completeness have been pointed out, e.g., by de Jongh and Veltman [JV90]. Let
us adapt such arguments to our setting:
Theorem 6.5. i-X is not strongly complete whenever
• it is contained between iA + L2 and c-GL2 + Lin2 or
• it is contained between iA + L2 and i-KM.lina.
In particular, i-GLa, i-GWa, i-PreL or i-KMa fail to be strongly complete.
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Proof sketch. We can work in the standard modal language containing just 2
rather J (in fact, 2 and→ are the only connectives really used). We can also use
the freedom offered by Theorem 6.3 and choose to disprove global completeness.
Consider now Γ := {2pi+1 → pi | i ∈ ω} and note that that in any model where
Γ is globally satisfied but p0 fails, there must exists an infinite <-ascending
chain, which allows us to refute Noetherianity, hence refuting L2.
However, taking < to be an ordered sum of ω with its copy with reverse
ordering ω∗,  to be either (for the first clause) discrete or (for the second
clause) the reflexive version of < and setting V (pi) := (i + 1) ↑ produces a
model where Γ is globally valid, p0 fails and all theorems of i-X hold under V
(despite being refutable in the underlying frame). 2
Theorem 6.4 above does not cover correspondence and completeness claims for
all axioms and frame conditions displayed in Figure 6.2, especially those not
directly related to preservativity and provability principles. As it turns out,
there is a technique of transferring generic results available for (bi)modal logics
over CPC into the intuitionistic setting. For 2-logics, it has been developed in a
series of papers by Wolter and Zakharyaschev [WZ97; WZ98]. We are going to
present details of generalization of this technique to J-logics in a separate paper
[LV]. For now, let us just list some consequences regarding strong completeness
and canonicity (we leave the finite model property out of the picture here):
Theorem 6.6 ([LV]).
a. iA+CBa correspond to the class of <-dominated frames of Figure 6.2 and is
strongly complete.
b. iA+CB2 correspond to the class of weakly <-dominated frames of Figure 6.2
and is strongly complete.
c. i-mHCa is strongly complete (wrt the class of strong <-dominated frames) .
d. iA + Lina correspond to the class of weakly semilinear frames of Figure 6.2
and is strongly complete.
e. iA + Lin2 correspond to the class of strongly semilinear frames of Figure 6.2
and is strongly complete.
f. iA + C42 correspond to the class of semi-dense frames of Figure 6.2 and is
strongly complete.
g. iA + C4a correspond to the class of pre-reflexive frames of Figure 6.2 and is
strongly complete.
h. iA+Appa correspond to the class of almost reflexive frames of Figure 6.2 and
is strongly complete.
i. i-PLAA is strongly complete (wrt the class of strong almost reflexive frames) .
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6.3. Non-derivations
Having a developed semantics, we are now in a position to provide more exam-
ples of non-derivations between formulas and non-containments between logics.
Example 6.7. Consider the formula φ0 := 2⊥ J ⊥ → 2⊥. It is easy to
see that this formula is in the closed fragment of i-GWa. This means that φ0
is variable-free and provable in i-GWa. We show that φ0 is not in the closed
fragment of i-GLa.
By Theorem 6.4g, i-GLa is determined by Noetherian gathering frames. Con-
sider the following (Noetherian gathering) model:
c
a // b
HH VV
All points are <-irreflexive. We set b  c,
a < b < c and the valuation is empty, i.e.,
V (a) = V (b) = V (c) = ∅. Note that CBa
holds in this model.
Clearly, a  2⊥ J ⊥, but a 1 2⊥.
Example 6.8. Consider the formula φ1 := 2⊥ J p → 2(2⊥ → p). Lemma
4.14d implies that this formula is provable in i-PreL. We prove that i-GWa 0 φ1
by considering the following model satisfying the condition for finite frames for
i-GWa as stated in Theorem 6.4h (and Figure 6.2):
d  p c
a //
::
b
II UU
:: All points are <-irreflexive. We set
b↑⊇ {c, d}, a < b, b < d, a < d and
the valuation is V (d) = p and empty
otherwise.
It is now easy to see that a  2⊥ J p, but a 1 2(2⊥ → p).
Example 6.9. We can improve Example 6.8 by providing a separating closed
formula. Consider the formula
φ2 := 22⊥ J ¬¬2⊥ → 2(22⊥ → ¬¬2⊥).
Again, Lemma 4.14d implies that this formula is provable in i-PreL. We prove
that i-GWa 0 φ2 by considering the following model satisfying the condition for
finite frames for i-GWa as stated in Theorem 6.4h (and Figure 6.2):
f
d
UUOO
e coo
a
55
//
;;
EE
b
ii
ZZ
__
<<VVOO
All points are <-irreflexive.
As usual, we do not draw the
transitive and reflexive closure
of → (which, recall, stands for
the poset order ). The
valuation is empty (and
irrelevant anyway).
It is now easy to see that a  22⊥ J ¬¬2⊥, but a 1 2(22⊥ → ¬¬2⊥).
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Example 6.10. Recall that following Lemma 4.6, we noted that in the disjunction-
free setting, there is no one-variable formula φ(p) s.t. p J q a`− φ(p) J (p→ q)
and CPC ` φ(p). This follows from the fact that
φ3 := p J q → (¬¬p→ p) J (p→ q)
is not a theorem of iA:
c  p d
a // b
OO
:: All points are <-irreflexive. We set q to
be false everywhere. It is easy to check
the antecendent of φ3 holds at a, but the
consequent fails. It is worth noting that
i-PreL holds in this model.
We can complement this observation by another one: it is not possible to im-
prove the iA-equivalence of Theorem 4.6 by taking a one-variable intuitionistic
formula stronger that p ∨ ¬p as the antecedent of J replacing em, as
φ4 := p J q → (¬¬p ∨ ¬p) J (p→ q)
is not a theorem of iA either:
c  p
a // b
OO
All points are <-irreflexive. We set q
to be false everywhere. Again the
antecendent of φ4 holds at a, but the
consequent fails; moreover, i-PreL
holds in this model.
Example 6.11. Here are diagrams illustrating that CBa is not a theorem of
i-mHC2; that is, strong frames which are only weakly <-dominated. We use the
convention that ◦ stand for a <-reflexive loop and • for lack thereof.
•
◦
OO •
• ''77
??
99• &&44
OO
. . .
aa
Arithmetical interpretation provides another interesting way of distinguishing
between CB2 and CBa: § 5.4.4 noted that CB2 is in the preservativity logic of
PA∗, whereas as stated in Theorem 8.10, CBa does not belong to this system
(the only problem is that neither does Di).
Example 6.12. So far, we were seeing examples showing that principles for J
are often properly stronger than their relatives formulated in terms of 2 only.
Recall that when introducing Fact 4.18, we indicated it is not always the case, as
witnessed by semi-linearity axioms. Here is a simple frame for i-GWa+Lina where
Lin2 fails (for both claims one can use Theorem 6.6 and Figure 6.2, but they
are straightforward to verify anyway). We are following the same conventions
regarding <-reflexive and <-irreflexive points as in the preceding example:
• •
• //
??
•
GG WW ??
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Example 6.13. In order to separate C42, C4a and Appa, we provide an example
of a semi-dense frame which is not pre-reflexive (on the left) and a pre-reflexive
one which are not almost reflexive (on the right):
• ◦oo
•
OO
// ◦
OO
•
•
??
◦
WW
Again, even without using completeness results of Theorem 6.6, one can easily
verify everything by hand (including finding suitable valuations).
Example 6.14. In § 7.1, we will use the fact that i-PLAA does not contain
Box. As made clear by Theorem 6.6 and Figure 6.2, for this purpose we need a
strong almost reflexive frame which is not brilliant:
• 66(( ◦ // •
7. Strength: arrows, monads, idioms and guards |
We have already seen that arithmetical interpretation of modalities provides
good motivation for studying intuitionistic logics with strict implication, in-
cluding those with the strength axiom. This is a very good motivation indeed,
but by no means the only one. Such formalisms have continuously reappeared
in several recent lines of research, especially in theoretical computer science.
7.1. Notions of computation and arrows
Surprisingly, the functional programming community discovered a variant of
constructive strict implication at roughly the same time as it appeared in the
context of preservativity. More specifically, “(classical) arrows” in the terminol-
ogy of John Hughes [Hug00] (see also [LWY11]) are in our terminology strong
Lewis arrows. Interestingly enough, their unary cousins knows as “idioms” or
“applicative functors” [MP08] were discovered later in this community, though
a special subclass of applicative functors—to wit, monads corresponding to
i-PLL2 modalities [BBP98; FM97; Kob97]—has been enjoying continuous at-
tention since the seminal paper of Moggi [Mog91]. A particularly convenient
basis for our discussion contrasting arrows, idioms and monads is provided by
Lindley et al. [LWY11], which we take as the main reference for this subsection.
The connection between intuitionistic logics and functional programming is
provided by the Curry-Howard correspondence, also known as the Curry-Howard
isomorphism or proposition-as-types paradigm (cf. [SU06]).27 While the details
are outside of the scope of this paper, the shortest outline is that
27As pointed out by Sørensen and Urzyczyn, “The Brouwer - Heyting - Kolmogorov -
Scho¨nfinkel - Curry - Meredith - Kleene - Feys - Go¨del - La¨uchli - Kreisel - Tait - Lawvere
- Howard - de Bruijn - Scott - Martin-Lo¨f - Girard - Reynolds - Stenlund - Constable -
Coquand - Huet - . . . - isomorphism might be a more appropriate name, still not including
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• (intuitionistic) formulas correspond to types,
• logical connectives correspond to type operators/constructors,
• logical axioms correspond to inhabited types and hence deciding theorem-
hood corresponds to the type inhabitation problem,
• logical proofs—e.g., in a variant of a natural deduction system or in a
Hilbert-style system—are encoded by proof terms—in a variant of lambda
calculus or of combinatory logic—understood as a (functional) program-
ming language and hence
• proof normalization corresponds to reduction of these terms, understood
as representing computation.
In particular, ordinary intuitionistic implication φ→ ψ corresponds to forming
the function space of programs (proofs) which take data from (proofs for) φ
as their input and produce members of (proofs for) ψ as their output. The
introduction rule for → corresponds to λ-abstraction and its elimination rule
(i.e., ordinary Modus Ponens) corresponds to function application.
Nevertheless, one may ask: are “computations” exactly co-extensional with
“members of function space”? In the words of Ross Paterson
Many programs and libraries involve components that are function-like,
in that they take inputs and produce outputs, but are not simple func-
tions from inputs to outputs. . . [S]uch “notions of computation” defin[e] a
common interface, called “arrows”. [Pat03, p. 201]
What are the laws such a notion of computation is supposed to satisfy? The
inhabitation laws of the calculus of “classic arrows” [LWY11, Fig. 4] in a
disjunction-free language are given by the following axioms:28
Sa (φ→ ψ)→ φ J ψ,
Tr φ J ψ → ψ J χ→ φ J χ,
K′a φ J ψ → (φ ∧ χ) J (ψ ∧ χ).
Thanks to Lemmas 4.1 and 4.10, we know it is just an axiomatization for i-SA−!
Open Question 7.1. As Lindley et al. [LWY11] work in a type theory
without the co-product operator (i.e., the Curry-Howard counterpart of
disjunction), the issue of validity of Di simply does not arise. Nevertheless,
given the problematic status of Di in preservativity logics of some theories
all the contributors.” [SU06, p. viii] Indeed, the Curry-Howard isomorphism provides the
most commonly accepted specification of the Brouwer-Heyting-Kolmogorov interpretation of
intuitionistic connectives. We could thus only half-jokingly argue that this subsection is yet
another place in our paper where Lewis meets Brouwer.
28Lindley et al. [LWY11] call these axioms arr, >>> and first, respectively. They also use
; in place of J.
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(cf. Open Question 5.7), it seems a valid question whether Di should be a
law imposed on all notions of computation—and if not, how to characterize
those where it holds. It is an inhabited type for both arrows with apply
(monads) and static arrows (idioms), as follows from the discussion below
and, correspondingly, Lemmas 4.17g and 4.16c.
What is the status of the Box law then (or any of its equivalent forms)? As
it turns out, the Curry-Howard interpretation provides another rationale for
considering (strong) Lewis arrows not determined by an unary 2. Lindley et
al. [LWY11] call arrows satisfying Box static arrows and show that such arrows
correspond to the “idioms” or “applicative functors” of McBride and Paterson
[MP08]. Indeed, the inhabitation laws of the calculus for idioms [LWY11, Fig.
3] are exactly those of i-S2. This is, however, only a special subclass of com-
putations encoded by arrows: namely those computations “in which commands
are oblivious to input” [LWY11]. Lindley [Lin14] rephrases this claim to the
effect that idioms are distinguished by their static approach to data flow.
However, as said above, just a special subclass of applicative functors is by
far the most important from a programming point of view: that of (strong)
monads. This subclass of idioms whose type system satisfies in addition the
inhabitation law corresponding to C42 (and, obviously, a number of equalities
between proof terms, which are not of concern to us here) provides the most
popular framework for effectful computations. In other words, the Curry-Howard
counterpart (the logic of type inhabitation) of the calculus for (strong) monads
proposed by Moggi under the name of computational metalanguage [Mog91] is
i-PLL2: propositional lax logic [BBP98; FM97; Kob97].
Monads can be shown [Hug00; LWY11] to be in 1-1 correspondence with
higher-order arrows or classical arrows with apply. To wit, these are arrows
satisfying the law:
Appa (φ ∧ (φ J ψ)) J ψ.
Thus, by Lemma 4.17, the logic of type inhabitation for this subclass of ar-
rows is precisely i-PLAA (propositional logic of arrows with apply). Lindley et
al. present a two-context natural deduction system for both i-SA− and i-PLAA,
whose proof-term assignment is based on a distinction between terms and com-
mands and argue that higher-order arrows are “promiscuous (in the broader
sense of undiscriminating)”, as the “apply” construct corresponding to Appa
bridges this distinction carefully maintained in the calculus for i-SA− (which can
be thus called meticulous). Another perspective is offered by Lindley [Lin14]:
higher-order arrows are distinguished by their dynamic approach not only to
data flow, but also to control flow.
Remark 7.2. The correspondence between monads and arrows with apply
should not be conflated with the one between idioms (whose logic of type inhab-
itation is i-SA−) and static arrows, whose logic of type inhabitation is i-BoxSA:
i.e., a system where φ J ψ is definable as 2(φ → ψ). In contrast, Box is ob-
viously not valid in i-PLAA (cf. Example 6.14) and the 2-only fragment of
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i-PLAA + Box is a 2-logic stronger than i-PLL2; e.g., we have that
i-PLAA + Box ` 2(2φ→ φ)
and one can easily check that i-PLL2 6` 2(2φ→ φ). Instead, i-PLAA is embed-
ded into i-PLL2 by interpreting φ J ψ as φ → 2ψ, cf. [LWY11, § 6]. In fact,
we can derive this fact syntactically from Lemma 4.17f above!
Remark 7.3. To finish this subsection on another theme from Lewis, note
that Symbolic Logic [LL32] had this to say about Appa (appearing therein as
postulate 11.7 in the main text and in the famous Appendix II as B7):
It might be supposed that this principle would be implicit in any set of
assumptions for a calculus of deductive inference. As a matter of fact,
11.7 cannot be deduced from other postulates. [LL32, p. 125]
The last sentence29 is pertinent indeed: Appa is the only axiom of the smallest
system Lewis was interested in, i.e., S1, which is not a theorem of iA−!
7.2. Modalities for guarded (co)recursion
Another area of recent computer science where strong intuitionistic modalities
have found numerous applications is the study of guarded (co)recursion: as
an important tool to ensure productivity in (co)programming with coinductive
types [KB11a; KB11b; KBH12; AM13; Møg14; BM15; CBGB15] and, on the
metalevel, in semantic reasoning about programs involving higher-order store
or a combination of impredicative quantification with recursive types [DAB11;
BMSS12; BBM14; SB14; SBB15; Jun+15; BGCMB16].
The logics of type inhabitation of these systems are mostly extensions of
i-SL2, involving either first- or higher-order quantifiers (corresponding to de-
pendent, polymorphic or impredicative types) or additional entities like clock
variables [AM13; Møg14; BM15; BGCMB16], or (a constructive analogue of)
the universal modality [CBGB15]. Nakano [Nak00; Nak01] proposed using the
axioms of i-SL2 for approximation modality crediting Sambin-de Jongh-style re-
sults on elimination of fixpoints as one of his motivations (see [Lit14, § 3] for a
detailed discussion of this point); more recent discussion of Nakano-style systems
can be found in Abel and Vezzosi [AV14] and Severi [Sev17]. The idea of using
such modalities also in the metalanguage for reasoning about semantics of pro-
grams has been popularized by Appel et al. [AMRV07], who were nevertheless
working with the axiom L2 rather than SL2 seen in most later references.
As the above overview makes clear, the area has grown too large to allow an
adequate summary in this paper. See [Lit14] for more information and [ML17]
for an overview of models of guarded (co)recursion, i.e., from our point of view,
categorical models for proof systems for fragments of such logics. Our question
here is whether the Lewis arrow naturally occurs in this context.
29It is proved later on p. 495 of [LL32] using a matrix proposed by Parry.
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In fact, starting from the original paper of Nakano [Nak00] and even more so
in references like Abel and Vezzosi [AV14], the introduction/elimination/inference
rules governing the behaviour of such an“approximation” or “delay” modality
are often formulated combining 2 and→. This point is perhaps most explicitly
addressed by Clouston and Gore´ [CG15], a reference highly relevant from our
point of view, as it does use J (denoted therein as ), claiming moreover:
The main technical novelty of our sequent calculus is that we leverage the
fact that the intuitionistic accessibility relation is the reflexive closure of
the modal relation, by decomposing implication into a static (classical)
component and a dynamic ‘irreflexive implication’ J that looks forward
along the modal relation. In fact, this irreflexive implication obviates
the need for 2 entirely, as 2φ is easily seen to be equivalent to > J φ.
Semantically, the converse of this applies also, as φ J ψ is semantically
equivalent to 2(φ → ψ), but the J connective is a necessary part of our
calculus. We maintain 2 as a first-class connective in deference to the
computer science applications and logic traditions from which we draw,
but we note that formulae of the form 2(φ → ψ) are common in the
literature—see Nakano’s (→ E) rule [Nak00], and even more directly the
~ constructor of [BM13]. We therefore suspect that treating J as a first-
class connective could be a conceptually fruitful side-benefit of this work
([CG15], in a notation adjusted to this paper).
Clouston and Gore´ [CG15] provide a sequent calculus for a logic called here
i-KM.lina. The focus on this logic is motivated by Litak’s observation [Lit14]
that i-KM.lin2 is the propositional fragment of the Mitchell-Be`nabou logic of
the topos of trees proposed as a model of guarded (co)recursion by Birkedal and
coauthors [BMSS12] and used ever since [Møg14; CBGB15; Sev17].
Let us note here that Lemma 4.19 implies that any semantics for i-KM.lina
must make Box valid: in other words, i-KM.lina can be just seen as another syn-
tactic presentation of i-KM.lin2. However, Lemma 4.19 requires all the axioms of
i-KM.lin2 and when studying broader classes of models of guarded (co)recursion
[ML17], more flexibility in adding J is possible.
Open Question 7.4. Are there natural applications ofJ-logics not includ-
ing the Box axiom in terms of guarded (co)recursion? And, more broadly,
do arithmetically relevant principles discussed in this paper have a compu-
tational interpretation?
Let us add that, while Gentzen-style systems are not our main interest here,
the above quote from Clouston and Gore´ [CG15] hints at another motivation for
studying constructive J. Namely, even in the setups which make it a definable
connective, it can still prove a more convenient primitive from a proof-theoretical
point of view than 2 is.
7.3. Intuitionistic epistemic logic
Finally, let us briefly mention yet another recent area of research where strong
intuitionistic modalities made a surprising appearance: in the work of Artemov
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and Protopopescu on intuitionistic epistemic logic [AP16], presented also in this
collection.30 These authors work with unary 2 and call S2 the principle of “co-
reflection”. The minimal system denoted by these authors as IEL− corresponds
to i-S2 in our notation, their IEL is obtained by adding
31 ¬2⊥ and IEL+ arises
by adding C42—i.e., is an extension of i-PLL2.
A proof-theoretic justification for these systems is presented in terms of the
Brouwer-Heyting-Kolmogorov interpretation. This seems to provide a natural
connection with references discussed in § 7.1—but, curiously, none of them
seems to be mentioned by Artemov and Protopopescu, neither the extensive
literature on i-PLL2, nor the roˆle of i-S2 as the logic of applicative functors
(idioms, prenuclei . . . ). We leave an epistemic interpretation of strong arrows
and extensions of i-SA as a promising subject for future study.
8. Applications of preservativity »
Having briefly overviewed other motivations for studying constructive J, let us
return to our main one. Preservativity has many applications. A number of
these applications can be found in [Vis85] and [Vis94]. We describe one of the
main results of those papers in § 8.1. In § 8.2, we show how one can capture the
invalidity of the law of excluded middle in terms of preservativity. We illustrate
how this result imposes a constraint on possible preservativity logics of theories.
8.1. NNIL
The NNIL-formulas (No Nestings of Implications to the Left [Vis85; Vis94]) are
defined as follows:
• φ ::= ⊥ | > | p | (φ ∧ φ) | (φ ∨ φ) | (p→ φ)
It is easy to see that there are only finitely many nonequivalent NNIL-
formulas on finitely many variables. Let ~p be the propositional variables of φ
and define φ? as the disjunction of representatives of all IPC-equivalence classes
of NNIL-formulas ψ in the variables ~p such that IPC ` ψ → φ. Using the Inter-
polation Theorem, we see that, for any NNIL-formula χ, we have IPC ` χ → φ
if and only if IPC ` χ→ φ?. So, φ? is the best NNIL-approximation from below
of φ. In more fancy terms, (·)? is the right adjoint of the embedding functor
of the preorder category of the NNIL-formulas into the preorder category of all
propositional formulas, both preorders being IPC-provable implication.
Theorem 8.1 ([Vis85; Vis94]). For any function f from the propositional vari-
ables to Σ01-sentences, φ
f JHA (φ?)f . Hence, if HA ` φf , then HA ` (φ?)f .
30For other approaches to intuitionistic epistemic logic cf. also Williamson [Wil92] or Proi-
etti [Pro12] and for a more dynamic take, see Kurz and Palmigiano [KP13].
31Litak [Lit14] denotes ¬2⊥ as (nv)—non-verum.
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The original aim of [Vis85] was to show: if HA ` φf , then HA ` (φ?)f . How-
ever, it turned out that the inductive assumption requires the stronger state-
ment involving preservativity. Thus, preservativity was discovered as a tool for
induction loading.
Theorem 8.1 can be reformulated in terms of admissible consequence. We define:
• φ ∼HA,Σ01 ψ if for any Σ
0
1-substitution f , HA ` ψf whenever HA ` φf .
Thus, φ ∼HA,Σ01 ψ means that φ/ψ is an admissible rule for Σ
0
1-substitutions
over HA. Theorem 8.1 now simply says: φ ∼HA,Σ01 φ
?. It is optimal in the sense
that, whenever φ ∼HA,Σ01 ψ, we have IPC ` φ? → ψ [Vis94]. Thus,
φ ∼HA,Σ01 ψ iff φ
? `IPC ψ.
If we view ∼HA,Σ01 and `IPC are pre-ordering categories, this says that (·)? is
the left adjoint of the embedding functor of ∼HA,Σ01 in `IPC.
The NNIL-formulas play an important roˆle in: the characterization of the prov-
ability logic of HA for Σ01-substitutions by Ardeshir and Mojtahedi [AM14], the
study of infon logic [CG13] and several other contexts [Ren89; VBJL95; Yan08].
8.2. On the falsity of Tertium non Datur
In intuitionistic propositional logic, we have the principle ¬¬ (φ ∨ ¬φ). As a
consequence, there is no direct logical expression of the constructive insight of
the invalidity of the law of excluded middle.32 The connective (·) J ⊥ is a weaker
form of negation, say ∼. Can we have, provably in i-EA, that ∼HA (A ∨ ¬A),
for some suitable A?
We will show that, for a wide range of theories T , we can indeed find such a
sentence A, including T being HA, HA + MP or HA + ECT0, HA
∗. We write:
• T ≤ U if i-EA verifies that T is a subtheory of U .
Suppose i-EA verifies Di for U , i.e. suppose that Di is in ΛF1,U ,i-EA. We note that
over i-EA we have (2U⊥ ∨ ¬2U⊥) JU 2U⊥. This is in the desired direction
since we can consider 2U⊥ as a weak form of falsity. However, we cannot get
the desired result as long as we stay with Σ01-sentences.
Theorem 8.2. Consider any consistent theory U . There is, verifiably in i-EA+
3U>, no Σ1-sentence S such that ∼U (S ∨ ¬S).
Proof. We work in i-EA + 3U>. Consider a Σ1-sentence S. Suppose we have
∼U (S ∨ ¬S). It follows that (S → (S ∨ ¬S)) JU (S → ⊥). Thus, > JU ¬S,
¬S JU (S ∨ ¬S) and (S ∨ ¬S) JU ⊥. Ergo, 2U⊥. Quod non. 2
32We can consistently add ¬∀x (A(x) ∨ ¬A(x)) to constructive arithmetic for certain A.
E.g., HA plus a weak version of Church’s Thesis (cf. Appendix A) proves ¬∀x (x · x ↓∨x · x ↑).
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To prepare the construction of the promised sentence, we first consider theories
V with HA ≤ V . Recall that 2V,xA stands for (arithmetized) provability from
the axioms of V with Go¨del number ≤ x.
• Feferman provability for V is defined by: 4VA := ∃x (2V,xA ∧3V,x>).
We have:33
Fe1 V ` A ⇒ V ` 4VA.
Fe2 i-EA ` 4V (A→ B)→ (4VA→4VB).
Fe3 i-EA ` S →4V S, for Σ01-sentences S.
We note that it follows that i-EA ` 2VB →4V2VB.
Fe4 i-EA ` 4VB → 2VB.
Fe5 i-EA ` 3V> → (4VA↔ 2VA).
Fe6 i-EA ` OV>, where O is ¬4¬.
We note that classically Fe4 follows form Fe5.
Shavrukov [Sha94] provides a complete axiomatization for the bimodal logic
of ordinary provability and Feferman provability for PA.
Open Question 8.3. Shavrukov employs a different interpretation of
2PA,x, to wit provability in IΣx. It would be interesting to find a better
analogue of the version of the Feferman predicate employed by Shavrukov
for the case of (extensions of) HA. Moreover, the principles given above
provide a part of the principles given by Shavrukov for the classical case.
We do not get all Shavrukov’s principles in the constructive case. It would
be interesting to study how close we can get to his system.
Note that, supposing that V is consistent, we cannot get that, for all A,
we have V ` 4VA → 4V4VA. Otherwise, we could reproduce the reason-
ing for Go¨del’s Second Incompleteness Theorem. This leads immediately to a
contradiction with Fe6.
We remind the reader that the theory V is V -verifiably essentially reflexive.
This means that both truly and V -provably, we have: for all n and all A, we
have V ` 2V,nA→ A.34
Theorem 8.4. Suppose HA ≤ T . We have i-EA ` A JV 4VA.
33We do not present the principles for triangle as a schematic logic. This is because of
the occurrence of a variable over Σ01-sentences. We would need a many-sorted propositional
theory. Of course this is perfectly doable. We just did not develop it in this paper.
34We have this even for formulas A, when we employ the usual convention for free variables
under the box.
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Proof. Reason in i-EA. Consider any x. We have, by essential reflexivity,
2V (2V,xA→ (2V,xA ∧3V,x>)).
Hence, 2V (2V,xA→4VA). Ergo, by Theorem 5.5, A JV 4VA. 2
Consider the Go¨del sentence GV of Feferman provability for V . We have then
i-EA ` GV ↔ ¬4VGV . Whenever the intended theory is clear from the context,
we write G for GV .
Theorem 8.5. Suppose HA ≤ V . Then, i-EA ` G JV ⊥ and i-EA ` ¬G JV ⊥.
Proof. We reason in i-EA.
We have G JV 4VG, and hence, G JV ¬G. Since also G JV G, it follows that
G JV ⊥.
We have, ¬G JV 4VG and ¬G JV 4V ¬G. Hence, ¬G JV 4V⊥. So, by
Fe6, we have ¬G JV ⊥. 2
Theorem 8.6. Suppose HA ≤ T and that T0 verifies Di for T , i.e. that Di is
in ΛF1,U ,T0 . Then, we have T0 `∼T (GT ∨ ¬GT ).
This follows immediately from Theorem 8.5. The reason why T0 appears in the
formulation is that we want the result both for T0 = i-EA and for T0 = T .
Open Question 8.7. Can we extend Theorem 8.6 to cases where we do
not have HA ≤ T?
We can now show that the preservativity logic of PA∗ does not contain Di and
CBa. We first prove a purely modal result that delivers both cases. We can
achieve it in two ways.
Theorem 8.8.
A. i-GWa + CB2 ` (p J ⊥ ∧ ¬ p J ⊥)→ 2⊥.
B. i-GLa + CB2 ` (p J ⊥ ∧ ¬ p J ⊥)→ 2⊥.
Proof. (A): We reason in i-GWa +CB2+ (p J ⊥∧¬ p J ⊥). By Di, we have (a)
(p ∨ ¬ p) J ⊥. On the other hand, we have, by CB2, that 2⊥ → (p ∨ ¬ p). By
Na, we have (b) 2⊥ J (p ∨ ¬ p). Combining (a) and (b), we find 2⊥ J ⊥ and,
hence, by Wa, we obtain 2⊥.
(B): We reason in i-GLa + CB2 + (p J ⊥ ∧ ¬ p J ⊥). By Di, we have (a)
(p ∨ ¬ p) J ⊥. The principle CB2 gives us 2⊥ → (p ∨ ¬ p). It follows, by
Na, that 22⊥ → 2(p ∨ ¬ p). Ergo, we have 22⊥ → 2⊥. We now apply
the extended Lo¨b’s Rule, using that our assumption (p J ⊥ ∧ ¬ p J ⊥) is
self-necessitating, to conclude that 2⊥. 2
As an immediate consequence of Theorems 8.5, 8.6 and 8.8, we have:
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Theorem 8.9. Suppose HA ≤ T and T is Σ01-sound. Then, we cannot have
both Di and CB2 in Λ
◦
T .
Theorem 8.10. Neither Di nor CBa are in Λ
◦
PA∗ .
Proof. Since PA∗ is Σ01-sound and validates CB2, by Theorem 8.9, it cannot
validate Di. Suppose now PA∗ validates CBa. Then Λ◦PA∗ extends i-mHCa
− =
iA− + S2 + CBa. It follows, by Lemma 4.16(c), that Λ◦PA∗ contains Di. Quod
non, as we just saw. 2
Another salient consequence of Theorems 8.5, 8.6 and 8.8 is the following result.
Theorem 8.11. For no T ≥ HA, we have: Λ◦T = i-PreL + CB2.
Proof. Suppose HA ≤ T . Clearly, if (i-PreL + CB2) ⊆ Λ◦T , it follows that
T ` 2T⊥. But then 2⊥ ∈ Λ◦T . On the other hand, by a simple Kripke model
argument, we can show that i-PreL + CB2 0 2⊥. 2
Thus, not every extension of i-PreL− can be obtained as the preservativity logic
of a T ≥ HA.
We finish this subsection by giving a better condition under which CBa cannot
be in the preservativity logic of a theory. This condition will again imply that
CBa is not in Λ
◦
PA∗ .
Theorem 8.12. Suppose HA ≤ T , T has the disjunction property and T is
consistent. Then, Λ◦T does not contain CBa.
Proof. Suppose HA ≤ T , T has the disjunction property and T is consistent.
Moreover, suppose Λ◦T contains CBa. We will derive a contradiction.
Let G := GT . Since T ` G J ⊥, it follows, by CBa, that T ` G ∨ ¬G.
Hence, by the disjunction property, we find T ` G or T ` ¬G. Hence > JT G
and > JT ¬G. Ergo, T ` ⊥. 2
We note that PA trivially satisfies CBa. Moreover, HA ≤ PA and PA is (hope-
fully) consistent. However, PA does not have the disjunction property.
9. Conclusions
We are not nearly done, but our space is running out: if we did not stop now, we
would have to turn this paper into a monograph. We hope to have convinced the
reader that constructive J provides a fascinating subject of research wherever
it appears—be it computer science, philosophy or, especially, metatheory of
arithmetic. This last context is particularly rife in challenges, despite decades
of diligent research in the area. Let us highlight again several lists of unsolved
problems regarding arithmetical interpretations: Open Questions 5.4, 5.7, 5.9,
8.3, 8.7 and (in Appendix C below) C.4 and C.11.
This, however, is not the only area where interesting open questions abound.
As a simple example, consider the study of axiomatization and proof systems
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for various fragments of LJ (e.g., Open Questions 4.3 and 4.7). Moreover,
we have only briefly touched on the question of computational significance of
J. Extending category-, proof- and type-theoretic frameworks for “strong ar-
rows” in computer science (§ 7 and references therein) and providing Curry-
Howard/computational interpretations of different axioms in Table 4.2 (cf. in
particular Open Questions 7.1 and 7.4) would seem a natural research direction.
A century after the publication of Lewis’ first papers on J and the Survey,
the full potential of the strict implication connective still remains to be exploited.
It could have been otherwise if Lewis followed his evident interest in non-boolean
logics (cf. §2.2). Another decision which in hindsight proved premature was to
insist on principles like Appa in even the weakest variant of his system (cf.
Remark 7.3), which effectively rules out some of the most fruitful provability-
motivated applications of J. With these conceptual blocks out of the way and
having the advantage of an additional century worth of research on constructive
logic, we have no excuse not to carry the torch further.
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A. A recap of realizability –
We need Kleene’s T-predicate: T(e, x, p) means p is a halting computation for
the partial recursive function with index e on input x. We write U(p) = y for:
the result of computation p is y. We employ the usual assumptions that for at
most one p we have T(e, x, p) and that U(p) ≤ p. Define:
• e · x = y if ∃p (T(e, x, p) ∧ U(p) = y).
• p : (e · x = y) if T(e, x, p) ∧ U(p) = y.
• e ·z x = y if ∃p ≤ z p : (e · x = y) or (∀q ≤ z ¬T(e, x, q) ∧ y = 0).
• e · x ↓ for (the partial recursive function with index) e being defined on x
and e · x ↑ otherwise.
Sometimes we will need Kleene application for functions of several arguments.
In such cases, we will write x · (~y ). The tuple (~y ) is tacitly identified with a
number, in particular we use ε for the (code of the) empty sequence.
We have several variants of the (intuitionistic) Church’s Thesis:
CT0 ∀x∃y Axy → ∃e ∀x ∃y (e ·x = y∧Axy). This is the standard arithmetical
form of the Thesis, with only numerical quantifiers appearing (modulo
a version of the choice principle), rather than an universally quantified
function symbol [Tro73, 1.11.7,p.95], [TD88, 4.3,p.193].
CT0! ∀x ∃!y Axy → ∃e ∀x ∃y (e·x = y∧Axy). This slightly weakened form will
play a central roˆle in Appendix C.4.2, where more references are provided.
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ECT0 is the extended Church’s Thesis [TD88, 4.4,p.199], [Tro73, 3.2.14,p.195]:
∀x (Bx→ ∃y Axy)→ ∃e∀x (Bx→ ∃y (e · x = y ∧Axy))
where B ranges over almost negative formulas:
• B ::= S | (B ∧B) | (B → B) | ∀v B
and S ranges over Σ01-formulas. Almost negative formulas will play an important
roˆle in Appendix C.4.3.
From § 5.4.1 on, we have been using the notion of q-realizability [Tro73,
§ 3.2.3, p. 189], a variant of the usual Kleene realizability:
xq˜A := A (A atomic)
xq˜(A ∧B) := (j1x)q˜A ∧ (j2x)q˜B
xq˜(A ∨B) := (j1x = 0→ (j2x)q˜A) ∨ (j1x 6= 0→ (j2x)q˜B)
xq˜(A→ B) := (A→ B) ∧ ∀v(vq˜A→ ∃z(x · v = z ∧ zq˜B))
xq˜(∃vAv) := (j2x)q˜A(j1x)
xq˜(∀vAv) := ∀v(Av ∧ ∃z(x · v = z ∧ zq˜Av))
where j1, j2 are the inverses of a chosen pairing function. Note that, unlike
Troelstra [Tro73, § 3.2.3], we choose to plug additional conjuncts into clauses
for → and ∀, rather than for ∨ and ∃.
Apart for Troelstra [Tro73] and Troelstra and van Dalen [TD88], another
reference on realizability in HA we recommend is Dragalin [Dra88].
B. Π01-conservativity –
In this appendix, we discuss both classical and constructive interpretability logic.
An arithmetical theory U is Π01-conservative over a theory T or T I U if, for
all Π01-sentences P , we have, if U ` P , then T ` P .35,36 We write A IT B for
(T +A) I (T +B).
We expand the language of propositional logic with the unary 2 and the
binary . Consider any theory T . We set F2,T (2) := provT (v0) and F2,T () :=
piconT (v0, v1). Par abus de langage, we write IT for F2,T , thus introducing an
innocent ambiguity. We write Λ•T for ΛT,F2,T .
We note that a Π01-sentence is constructively equivalent to the negation of Σ
0
1
sentence. This implies that A → P is equivalent to ¬¬A → P . Thus, we
35The use of the notation I is just local in this paper. Often one uses Π01 .
36Reflection of the general case, where we also consider non-arithmetical theories, reveals
that Π1-conservativity is ‘really’ a relation between interpretations of a basic arithmetical
theory in various theories.
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find that ¬¬A and A are mutually Π01-conservative over T . This means that
2T can only be defined from IT for theories in which 2TA and 2T¬¬A are
provably equivalent for all A. Hence, in general provability cannot be defined
from Π01-conservativity over constructive theories.
B.1. The classical case
Consider a classical theory T . We have T -verifiably that A JT B iff ¬B IT
¬A, and A IT B iff ¬B JT ¬A. Thus, over T , Σ01-preservativity and Π01-
conservativity are intertranslatable. This tells us that the Σ01-preservativity
logic of T can be found via a transformation of the Π01-conservativity logic of T .
The logic ILM consists of c-GL2 plus the following principles.
J1 2(φ→ ψ)→ φ ψ BL 2(φ→ ψ)→ φ J ψ
J2 (φ ψ ∧ ψ  χ)→ φ χ Tr (φ J ψ ∧ ψ J χ)→ φ J χ
J3 (φ χ ∧ ψ  χ)→ (φ ∨ ψ) χ Ka (φ J ψ ∧ φ J χ)→ φ J (ψ ∧ χ)
J4 φ ψ → (3φ→ 3ψ) LB φ J ψ → (2φ→ 2ψ)
J5 3φ φ 4a φ J 2φ
M φ ψ → (φ ∧2χ) (ψ ∧2χ) Ma φ J ψ → (2χ→ φ) J (2χ→ ψ)
The list of principles for preservativity given above is equivalent to c-PreL :=
i-PreL− + em. See Lemma 4.1, Fact 4.2, Lemmas 4.11 and 4.14.
Theorem 12 of [BV05] yields that the Π01-conservativity logic of T is ILM
whenever T is an extension of IΠ−1 + Exp. This class of theories contains such
salient theories as IΣ1 and PA.
Thus, we have justified Theorem 5.10, which tells us that Λ◦T = c-PreL if T
is a Σ01-sound extension of IΠ
−
1 + Exp.
We note that the principle corresponding to La would have been:
(†) (φ I ψ ∧ φ I χ)→ φ I (ψ ∧ χ).
Let T be a Σ10-sound theory with PA ≤ T . Consider the sentence G := GT from
§ 8.2. Suppose T satisfies (†). We have, in T , both > IT G and > IT ¬G.
It follows that we have > IT ⊥, i.e. 2T⊥. However, this contradicts Σ10-
soundness.
B.2. The constructive case
In this subsection we zoom in on the case of HA. Here the situation for Π01-
conservativity is quite different. We still have, HA-verifiably, A IHA B iff
¬B JHA ¬A. However, we do not have the equivalence of A JHA B and
¬B IHA ¬A. The equivalence fails in both directions.
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We have (¬¬2HA⊥ → 2HA⊥) J 2HA⊥ [Vis94], but we do not have
¬2HA⊥ IHA ¬ (¬¬2HA⊥ → 2HA⊥), as this is equivalent to 2HA¬¬2HA⊥.
In the other direction, trivially, we do have ¬ (2HA⊥ ∨ ¬2HA) IHA ⊥. But
as shown in § 5.3, > J (2HA⊥ ∨ ¬2HA⊥) fails.
It is easily seen that the logic Λ•HA contains i-ILM, the theory axiomatized
by i-GL2+ J1-5 + M. However, it contains more. As noted above, we have the
principle ` ¬¬φ φ.
C. Interpretability –
In this appendix, we discuss both classical and constructive interpretability logic.
C.1. Basics
NB: The definitions of this subsection work for all theories in finite signature. So
in this subsection the theory need not be arithmetical and the axiom set can be
just any set of axioms regardless of the complexity.
As is well known, purely relational signatures can simulate signatures with terms
via a term-unraveling procedure. Thus, we can justify defining interpretations
only for relational languages. A one-dimensional translation τ between rela-
tional signatures Ξ and Θ provides a domain formula δτ (v0) of signature Θ and
assigns to each n-ary Ξ-predicate a Θ-formula Pτ (v0, . . . , vn−1). Here the vari-
ables of δτ and Pτ are among those shown. We define a translation A 7→ Aτ
from Ξ-formulas to Θ-formulas as follows:
• P τ (x0, . . . , xn−1) := Pτ (x0, . . . , xn−1) (in case an xi is not free for vi in
Pτ (v0, . . . , vn−1), we employ the mechanism of renaming bound variables.)
• (·)τ commutes with the propositional connectives.
• (∀xB)τ := ∀x (δτ (x)→ Bτ ), (∃xB)τ := ∃x (δτ (x) ∧Bτ ).
Nota bene: we also allow identity to be translated to a different formula.
We can define the more complex notion of many-dimensional translation
with parameters. In the many-dimensional case a sequence of objects of the
interpreting theory represents an object in the interpreted theory. In the case
with parameters allow a sequence of extra free variables, the parameters, to
occur in the domain formula and in the translations of the predicate symbols.
Suppose T has signature Θ and U has signature Ξ. We define:
• An interpretation K : U → T is a triple 〈U, τ, T 〉, such that, for all Ξ-
sentences A, if U ` A, then T ` Aτ .
• T  U if there is an interpretation K : U → T .
• AT B if (T +A) (T +B).
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If we allow parameters, we add a parameter-domain αK to the specification of
K. We demand that K : U → T iff, T proves that αK is non-empty and that,
for all Ξ-sentences A, if U ` A, then T ` ∀~w (αK(~w)→ Aτ,~w).
We write δK for δτK and PK for PτK . For more information about the
definition of an interpretation, see e.g. [Vis06a] and [Vis14].
In the case of extensions of i-EA as the interpreting theory one can show
that, for our purposes, allowing many-dimensional interpretations makes no dif-
ference. We can eliminate the higher dimensions using Cantor pairing. In case
we have extensions of PA as the interpreting theory, allowing parameters makes
no difference. We can eliminate parameters using the Orey-Ha´jek Characteri-
zation that guarantees an interpretation without parameters whenever there is
an interpretation.
In case we are not considering extensions of PA, it is in most cases unknown
whether allowing parameters has an effect on the interpretability logic.
If the interpreting theory is an extension of PA we can always eliminate
domain relativization and we can always replace an interpretation by an identity
preserving equivalent. In case the interpreted theory has PA-provably infinitely
many arguments, we even can do both at the same time.
If the interpreting theory is classical and does define one element in the
interpreted theory, we can eliminate the domain relativization by setting all
elements outside the original domain equal to the definable element. If we allow
parameters we can eliminate the domain relativization always as long as the
interpreting theory is classical.
C.2. Interpretability Logic introduced
The relation T can be arithmetized, say by intT . We expand the language of
propositional logic with the unary 2 and the binary . Consider any theory T
with a ∆0(exp)-axiomatization. We set F3,T (2) := provT (v0) and F3,T () :=
intT (v0, v1). Par abus de langage, we write T for F3,T , thus introducing an
innocent ambiguity. We write Λ˜T for ΛT,F3,T .
In the classical case 2TA is equivalent to ¬A T ⊥. Thus, classically, we
also have the option to expand only with  and treat 2 as a defined symbol.
This equivalence can fail intuitionistically. One can see this, e.g., by taking
T := HA and A := (2HA⊥∨¬2HA⊥). At present it is unknown whether 2HAA
is HA-provably equivalent to > HA A, so we cannot exclude that there would
be a definition of the 2 in terms of interpretability over HA.
C.3. Classical Interpretability Logic
Over PA arithmetic interpretability and Π01-conservativity coincide. Thus, the
Λ˜PA = ILM. The arithmetical completeness of ILM for interpretability over PA
was proven by Berarducci [Ber90] and Shavrukov [Sha88] proved that this result
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also holds for all Σ10-sound extensions of PA.
37 The reader is referred to [Jd98;
Vis98; AB04] for more information about classical interpretability logic.
We know two further arithmetically complete interpretability logics. The first
is ILP. This is the logic of Σ10-sound finitely axiomatized extensions of EA
+, also
known as I∆0 + Supexp. If we take the contraposed preservativity-style version
of ILP, we obtain the logic i-GW−a + Pa + em [Vis90].
C.4. Constructive Interpretability Logic
In this subsection we treat constructive interpretability logic with the inter-
pretability logic of HA as our main focus. We need some preliminary material
to get the discussion off the ground.
C.4.1. i-Isomorphism
The materials of the subsubsection work for any theories of finite signature.
We will need the notion of i-isomorphism between interpretations. Two in-
terpretations K,M : U → T are i -isomorphic if there is an i-isomorphism
G between K and M . A T -formula G is an i-isomorphism between K and
M if the theory T verifies that ‘G is a bijection between δK and δM that
preserves the predicate symbols of U ’. For example if P is unary, we ask:
T ` ∀u∀v ((δK(u) ∧ δM (v) ∧G(u, v))→ (PK(u)↔ PM (v))).
Let T be any extension of HA. Suppose K : i-EA→ T . We also have the identical
interpretation E : i-EA→ T that translates all predicate symbols to themselves.
E.g. AE(v0, v1, v2) := A(v0, v1, v2), where A is the relation representing addition.
Then, by a special case of the Dedekind-Pudla´k Theorem, there exists a formula
F such that T proves that F is an initial embedding of E in K. Now it is easy
to see that E is i-isomorphic to K iff T proves that F is surjective. Thus, there
is a single fixed statement, say CK , that expresses that E is i-isomorphic to K.38
C.4.2. CT0!
In this subsection, we present some basic facts about CT0! (cf. Appendix A),
which we will use to derive a new interpretability principle over HA.
The theorem below is proven in [Vis06b]. For completeness’ sake, we repeat the
proof here. The proof is an adaptation of the proof of Tennenbaum’s Theorem.
Such proofs were used before to prove the categoricity of i-EA in constructive
meta-theories under the assumption of Church’s Thesis and Markov’s Principle.
By taking some extra care we can avoid the assumption of Markov’s Principle.
37If we leave, for a moment, the context of arithmetical theories, we can say that the
result holds for all classical essentially reflexive sequential theories (with respect to some
interpretation of arithmetic).
38We need minor modifications of the formulation in case we have parameters.
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Theorem C.1. The theory i-EA verifies the following. Suppose T extends HA+
CT0! and K : T  i-EA. Then, T ` CK .
Proof. We give the proof for the case without parameters. We need minor
modifications to add parameters.
Suppose T extends HA+CT0! and K : T  i-EA. We note that i-EA proves that
λeλx.(e ·z x) is total. Let sig(x) = 1 if x > 0 and sig(x) = 0 if x = 0. Let F be
the initial embedding of E in K.
We work in T . Fix an element z of δK . We define the operation ∗ as follows.
• e∗z x = y if ∃e′ ∃x′ ∃y′ (F (e, e′)∧F (x, x′)∧F (y, y′)∧ (sig(e′ ·z x′) = y′)K).
It is easy to see that Hz := λe.(1 − e ∗z e) is a total 0,1-valued function. By
CT0!, there is a recursive function that computes Hz, say with index h. Let
p : (h · h = i). Suppose F (h, h′) and F (i, i′) and F (p, p′). We have Hz(h) = i
and, hence, h ∗z h = 1 − i. This means that (sig(h′ ·z h′) = 1 − i′)K . On the
other hand, since F is an initial embedding, we find (p′ : (h′ · h′ = i′))K .
We reason inside K. In case p′ ≤ z, we have that h′ · h′ = h′ ·z h′. Hence,
i′ = sig(1− i′). Quod non. Hence z < p′. We leave K.
Since F is an initial embedding, we can find a z∗ < p such that F (z∗, z). Since
z was an arbitrary element of δK , we may conclude that F is surjective. 2
It follows that the interpretability logic of extensions T of HA + CT0! contains
the following principle:
• φ ψ → 2(φ→ ψ).
Remark C.2. The Tarski biconditionals TB for the arithmetical language are
all sentences of the form True(pAq) ↔ A. It is clear that every arithmetical
theory locally interprets itself plus TB. In the classical case it follows that PA
(PA+TB). However, we cannot have HA(HA+TB). If we had HA(HA+TB),
then we would have K : (HA + CT0!)  (HA + TB), for some K. However,
since the reduct of K to the arithmetical language is i-isomorphic to E , this
would enable us to define truth for the arithmetical language in HA+CT0!. By
Tarski’s Theorem on the undefinability of truth, we would find that HA + CT0!
is inconsistent. Quod non.
For some further information about CT0!, see [van90a].
Remark C.3. With respect to interpretability, there is a certain analogy be-
tween HA + CT0! and HA
∗.
In [Vis06b], the following result is proved. Let τ be translation from the
arithmetical language to itself. Consider the theory T := HA∗+(i-EA)τ . Clearly,
τ carries an interpretation of i-EA in T . Let Fτ be the standard embedding of
the T -numbers into the τ -numbers. We have:
HA∗ + (i-EA)τ ` ∀y (δτ (y)→ (∃xFτ (x, y) ∨2HA⊥)).39
39In case τ has parameters a slight adaptation of the formulation is needed.
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It is easy to see that we cannot generally eliminate the 2HA⊥ from the result
since PA + 2PA⊥ is an extension of HA∗. The theory PA + 2PA⊥ has many
non-trivial interpretations of i-EA. It has not been explored whether the result
described here throws any shadows on the interpretability logic of HA.
C.4.3. The Interpretability Logic of HA
The interpretability logic of HA has not yet been studied. It seems to us that
there are some good reasons for this neglect, the first being that the more basic
problem of the provability logic of HA is still wide open. Unlike the case of the
logic of Σ01-preservativity, there are no indications that the study of the logic of
interpretability will help in the study of provability logic.
Interpretability itself is intuitionistically significant, e.g., the usual trans-
lations of elementary syntax in arithmetic work equally well classically and
intuitionistically. But—and here is our second reason—the usefulness of inter-
pretations to compare arithmetical theories is much diminished. For example,
the ¬¬-translation does not commute with disjunction, and, thus, fails to carry
an interpretation. The demand of commutation with disjunction and existential
quantification is much more restrictive intuitionistically than classically.
Still, studying the differences between the interpretability logic of HA and
that of PA highlights how the classical principles depend on the chosen logic.
Also, the relevant methods are quite interesting. Finally, a good friend makes
an appearance here: Tennenbaum’s Theorem plays a significant roˆle.
Which of the axioms of ILM remain in the interpretability logic of HA? The
principles of i-GL2 and the principles J1,2,4 and M are valid over HA. However,
J5 fails since, e.g., its instance 32⊥2⊥ fails.40 The status of J3 is unknown.
We note that the classical argument for J3 does yield following weakened version.
• (φ χ ∧ ψ  χ)→ ((φ ∨ ψ) ∧ ¬ (φ ∧ ψ)) χ
We define the modal Σ01-formulas as follows:
• σ ::= > | ⊥ | 2φ | (σ ∨ σ)
The following valid principle was noted by Lev Beklemishev in conversation.
• (σ  χ ∧ σ′  χ)→ (σ ∨ σ′) χ, with σ and σ′ being modal Σ01.
Open Question C.4. Let A0 := ∀S ∈ Σ01 (TrueΣ01S ∨ ¬TrueΣ01S) and
A1 := ∀S ∈ Σ01 (2HAS → TrueΣ01S). As 3HAA1 implies, by the Double
Negation Translation, 3PAA1, we have i-EA-verifiably (A0∧3HAA1)HAA1.
We can do then the Henkin construction for PA+A1 using the decidability
for Σ01-sentences. We also have trivially A1 HA A1. But do we have:
40The fact that 32⊥  2⊥ is not valid for HA follows, for example, from Theorem C.8 in
combination with what we already know about the provability logic of HA.
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((A0 ∧3HAA1) ∨A1)HA A1 ?
Similarly, we have for any B that (A0 ∧3HA>)HA (B ∨ ¬B). But do we
have for all B that
((A0 ∧3HA>) ∨B)HA (B ∨ ¬B) ?
Is the classically invalid principle ` (φ ψ ∧ φ χ)→ φ (ψ ∧ χ) still invalid
over HA? We do not know that for φ = >. However, the usual construction of
Orey sentences for PA can be adapted to give a sentence O such that AHA O
and AHA ¬O, where A is the universal closure of an instance of Tertium non
Datur that is sufficient to make the classical argument work.
Theorem C.1 throws a shadow downward on HA. We need to define the Γ0-
formulas to describe it. Let S range over Σ01-formulas and let A range over
almost negative formulas, as defined in Appendix A:
• B ::= S | (B ∧B) | (B ∨B) | (A→ B) | ∀xB | ∃xB
Anne Troelstra shows in [Tro73, §3.6.6] that HA+ECT0 is Γ0-conservative over
HA. A fortiori, HA + CT0! is Γ0-conservative over HA. Inspection of the proof
shows that this fact is verifiable in i-EA. We have:
Theorem C.5. The theory i-EA verifies the following. Suppose C is in Γ0. We
have: if
∧
i<n(Ai HA Bi) and HA `
∧
i<n(Ai → Bi)→ C, then HA ` C.
Proof. Suppose C is in Γ0 and
∧
i<n(AiHABi) and HA `
∧
i<n(Ai → Bi)→ C.
It follows that HA+CT0! `
∧
i<n(Ai → Bi) and HA+CT0! `
∧
i<n(Ai → Bi)→
C. Hence HA + CT0! ` C. Since C is in Γ0, it follows that HA ` C. 2
Corollary C.6. The theory i-EA verifies the following. Suppose A is almost
negative and B is in Γ0. Suppose further that AHA B. Then, HA ` A→ B.
Corollary C.7. The theory i-EA verifies the following: if >HA O and >HA
¬O, then HA ` ⊥. Thus, if HA is consistent, it has no Orey-sentences.
We give counterparts of the above classes in the modal language, beginning with
the almost negative ones.41 Let φ range over all formulas and
• σ ::= ⊥ | > | 2φ | (σ ∨ σ)
• ψ ::= σ | (ψ ∧ ψ) | (ψ → ψ)
41By the Orey-Ha´jek characterization, A PA B is a Π
0
2-relation. (It was shown to be
complete Π02 independently by Per Lindstro¨m and Robert Solovay.) No such reduction is
known for the relation AHA B. This relation is prima facie Σ
0
3 and might, for all we know,
be Σ03-hard. We note that Π
0
2 is almost negative but Σ
0
3 is not. So we cannot take φψ as a
modal almost negative formula. This does not exclude that further insight might allow us to
include it at a later stage.
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We define the Γ0-formulas of the bi-modal language as follows. Let φ range over
all formulas and let ψ range over the almost negative formulas.
• χ ::= ⊥ | > | 2φ | (φ φ) | (χ ∧ χ) | (χ ∨ χ) | (ψ → χ).
Theorem C.8. Let χ be in Γ0. The following principle is in the interpretability
logic of HA:
(
∧
i<n
(φi  ψi) ∧2(
∧
i<n
(φi → ψi)→ χ))→ 2χ.
Example C.9. The principle ` (¬¬2⊥ → 2⊥)  ¬¬2⊥ → 2¬¬2⊥ is valid
over HA. Since HA is HA-verifiably closed under the primitive recursive Markov’s
Rule, it follows that ` ((¬¬2⊥ → 2⊥)¬¬2⊥)→ 22⊥ is valid over HA.
Remark C.10. We note that the seemingly stronger principle
(
∧
i<n
(φi  ψi) ∧
∧
i<n
(φi → ψi) χ)→ 2χ.
in fact follows from Theorem C.8.
Open Question C.11. Is there an interpretation of i-EA in HA that is
not i-isomorphic to E?
There are many strengthenings of our question. We can demand HA-
verifiability of the self-interpretation. We could ask whether there is an
A such that >HA A, but HA 0 A. Etcetera.
If one combines the proof of Theorem C.1 with q-realizability, one obtains
the following. In case the domain and the parameter domain of an interpre-
tation K of i-EA in HA are auto-qa, then K is i-isomorphic with E . Thus, a
non-trivial interpretation i-EA in HA should either have a sufficiently com-
plex domain or a sufficiently complex parameter domain.b Note also that
>HA A both implies that 2HA+CT0!A and that >PA A, which puts some
severe constraints on the possible A.
aSee § 5.4.4 for the notion of auto-q.
bWe apologize for the classical reasoning. However, since the relevant predicates are
decidable, it can be constructively justified.
C.4.4. Interpretability and Π01-Conservativity
We have seen that interpretability and Π01-conservativity coincide over PA. Over
other classical theories, interpretability and Π1-conservativity part ways. For
example, they come apart over Primitive Recursive Arithmetic PRA: we have
> IPRA IΣ1, but not >PRA IΣ1.
Over HA, interpretability and Π1-conservativity likewise separate ways. We
still find that, HA-verifiably, HA is a sub-relation ofIHA. However, for example,
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we have 32HA⊥ IHA 2HA⊥, but not 32HA⊥ HA 2HA⊥. Also, ¬¬2HA⊥ IHA
2HA⊥, but not ¬¬2HA⊥HA 2HA⊥.42
D. The problem of the Survey =
We are returning here to the issue briefly mentioned in the main text: the
collapse of J to → in Lewis’ original system [Lew14; Lew18] discovered by
Post and addressed by Lewis in a subsequent note [Lew20]. This episode is
instructive in illustrating how Lewis’ own thinking about J was often sabotaged
by a combination of several factors, including:
• an insistence on boolean laws for “material” connectives, including in par-
ticular classical, involutive laws for negation;
• especially in the 1910’s, a certain carelessness in accepting deductive laws
for “intensional” connectives, especially those involving contraposition.
The second problem was pretty much admitted by Lewis himself:
In developing the system, I had worked for a month to avoid this principle,
which later turned out to be false. Then, finding no reason to think it
false, I sacrificed economy and put it in ([Lew30], via [Mur05, p.92]).
In hindsight, these problems are unsurprising, especially given the publication
date of the Survey. Not only were non-boolean systems in the prenatal stage,
but also semantics of propositional logics was poorly understood at the time.
Symbolic Logic published in 1932 was already in a much better position, mostly
thanks to efforts of Mordechaj Wajsberg and William Parry, who provided sev-
eral crucial algebraic (counter)models used in Appendix II to establish indepen-
dence results for axioms between S1 and S5. No such assistance was available to
Lewis when writing the earlier Survey and consequently, when deciding whether
or not to adopt a specific axiom for J, he would mostly rely just on his philo-
sophical intuitions, much like other authors in that period.43
From our point of view, it is of particular interest to isolate the actual
roˆle played by classical logic with its involutive negation, the axiom Box and
redefinition of 2 as (1) in the collapse of the system of the Survey.
42These results follow from Theorem C.8 in combination with facts about provability logic.
43Cf. in this respect his remark [Lew20]: “Mr. Post’s example which demonstrates the
falsity of 2.21 is not here reproduced, since it involves the use of a diagram and would require
considerable explanation.” A “diagram” is presumably a finite matrix/algebra (which could
indicate a largely overlooked inspiration Lewis’ work provided for Post in developing non-
classical logical “matrices”, a.k.a. algebras or truth-tables!). In Appendix II to Symbolic Logic,
the counterexamples of Parry and Wajsberg were called “groups”. It is worth mentioning that
early Lewis’ papers tended to have titles like Implication and the Algebra of Logic [Lew12],
A New Algebra of Implications and Some Consequences [Lew13], The Matrix Algebra for
Implications [Lew14] or A Too Brief Set of Postulates for the Algebra of Logic [Lew15], but
this should not mislead us: the word “algebra” (or “matrix”) is not taken here in the sense
of modern model theory or universal algebra.
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The problematic axiom is the converse of the one which was latter baptised
A8 in Appendix II to Symbolic Logic :
A8 (φ J ψ) J (¬3ψ J ¬3φ).
In the Survey, this axiom was postulated as a strict bi-implication, i.e.,
(φ J ψ)L (¬3ψ J ¬3φ).
In our setting, with 2 rather than 3 as the primitive and with φ not being
equivalent to ¬¬φ, the missing half can be rendered as
2.21 (2ψ J 2φ) J (¬φ J ¬ψ),
“2.21” being Lewis’ name for this axiom [Lew20]. Of course, there are other
conceivable variants, for example:
2.21′ (2¬φ J 2¬ψ) J (ψ J φ).
As it turns out, however, 2.21 is exactly what we need to reproduce Post’s
derivation over iA (together with a sub-boolean axiom Auxp introduced below).
To present further details, let us also recall that Lewis uses Modus Ponens for
J, i.e., φ φJψψ as the main inference rule. This in itself is telling: in iA, φ jointly
with φ J ψ entails only 2ψ. The rule 2φφ is admissible, but not derivable, unless
one postulates as an axiom explicitly 2φ→ φ, something that Lewis’ insistence
on formulating all the axioms with J as the principal connective prevented him
from doing; 2φ J φ is not quite the same thing.44
In the setup with Modus Ponens for J as the central rule and L as the
“real” equivalence or identity, instead of deducing φ ↔ 2φ in the extension of
our iA with Lewis’ axioms we need to show both 2φ J φ (which is already a
theorem for Lewis, cf. the discussion of Appa and Remark 7.3 above) and
4a φ J 2φ,
deriving 4a in turn requiring only finding another theorem χ s.t. χ J (φ J 2φ)
is also a theorem; in other words, to derive still weaker
24a 2(φ J 2φ).
This in turn can be done if one has both 2.21 and a law which is a mild conse-
quence of excluded middle, namely
44One can see here yet another instance of Lewis’ peculiar paradox, pointed out by Ruth
Barcan Marcus: despite his insistence that “the relation of strict implication expresses pre-
cisely that relation which holds when valid deduction is possible” and that “the system of
Strict Implication may be said to provide that canon and critique of deductive inference”
[LL32, p. 247], his own systems tend to run into problems with the relationship between →,
J, entailment and deducibility (relevance logicians would point it out too, cf. Footnote 15,
but their own systems have their own share of similar problems).
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Auxp (¬¬p J ¬(2p→ 2¬p)) J (p J 2p).
Note that to derive Auxp, it is enough to have as an axiom scheme, e.g.,
(¬¬2p ∧ ¬2¬p)→ 2p;
this is why we call Auxp a mild consequence of boolean laws.
Note also that in presence of 2.21, we have that
Auxp2 2(2p→ 2¬p) J 2¬p.
To get this formula, substitute ⊥ for φ and p for ψ in 2.21, use BL and the
fact that 2p → 2¬p a`− 2p → 2⊥. Now we can redo in our setting the Post
derivation as quoted by Lewis. Substituting 2p → 2¬p for ψ and ¬p for φ in
2.21 yields
((2p→ 2¬p) J 2¬p) J (¬¬p J ¬(2p→ 2¬p)).
The antecedent of this strict implication is precisely Auxp2 and the consequent
is the antecedent of Auxp.
Remark D.1. Of course, there are simpler ways of collapsing the system of the
Survey when full boolean logic and all Lewis axioms are assumed. Note that
using classical logic and Box (which is an axiom for Lewis, and as we established
in Corollary 4.8 can anyway be derived in iA + CPC), we can replace 2.21 with
2(2ψ → 2φ)→ 2(ψ → φ).
Classically, this axiom in turn can be replaced with
3ψ → 3(2ψ ∧3ψ).
Now, if 2φ→ φ (i.e., reflexivity) is also an axiom or a theorem (which, as shown
above, should be indeed the case in a modern representation of Lewis’ original
system, with 2φφ as an admissible or derivable rule), we can derive 2φ ↔ φ,
trivializing the modal operator.
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